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This thesis analyzes the motivations behind China’s decision to conduct extensive 
land reclamation and outpost construction projects at seven locations in the Spratlys 
beginning in late 2013.  I examined two hypotheses: first, China’s actions were mainly 
undertaken in reaction to the actions of rival claimants and the United States; and second, 
China acted primarily to extend its power projection capabilities.  The evidence shows 
that China’s decision to commence reclamation projects was ultimately driven by a desire 
to increase its power projection capabilities in the South China Sea.  This desire predates 
the internationalization of the South China Sea dispute in 2009 and was a result of 
China’s military growth and its enhancements to its own power projection capabilities.  
The proximate cause of China’s decision to begin these activities in late 2013 was a 
perceived need to react to its rivals, which from China’s perception had grown 
increasingly willing to confront China on its South China Sea sovereignty claims.  
Ultimately, whether China continues pursuit of enhanced power projection capabilities 
will be determined by how China perceives the threat environment and the actions of 
others.  Continued perceived provocations from China’s rivals may drive China toward 
further enhancement of its military power projection capabilities.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
China, in roughly September 2013, began large-scale reclamation and 
construction projects on the seven reefs it controls in the Spratly Islands.  According to a 
2015 U.S. Congressional Research Service report, “each of the areas under reclamation—
including Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef, Hughes Reef, Johnson South 
Reef, Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef—is disputed between China and at least one other 
claimant, including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Taiwan.”1  In a May 30, 
2015, speech, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter said that “China had created over 
2,000 acres of land in the South China Sea in the past 18 months, more than all other 
claimants combined … and more than in the entire history of the region.”2  A 2015 New 
York Times article highlighted the construction being done on the islands, stating that 
China has “constructed port facilities, military buildings, and an airstrip on the islands, 
with recent imagery showing evidence of two more airstrips under construction.”3  
Creation of these artificial islands and the new military bases being constructed upon 
them arguably changes the balance of power within the Spratlys in China’s favor. 
This thesis examines two prominent explanations to explain China’s broader 
behavior in the South China Sea and applies them to the Chinese government’s decision 
to conduct extensive land reclamation and outpost expansion projects.  These 
explanations are that China’s reclamation activities are 1) in response to the actions of the 
other Spratly Island claimants and the United States, and 2) are driven by a desire to 
increase China’s ability to project military power within the South China Sea. 
                                                 
1 Ben Dolven et al., Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea: Implications and Policy 
Options (CRS Report No. R44072) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), 4, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44072.pdf. 
2 United States Department of Defense, “IISS Shangri-la Dialogue: A Regional Security Architecture 
Where Everyone Rises,” May 30, 2015, accessed December 7, 2016, 
http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1945. 
3 Derek Watkins, “What China Has Been Building in the South China Sea,” New York Times, last 
modified October 27, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/world/asia/what-china-has-
been-building-in-the-south-china-sea.html?_r=1. 
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My findings are that China, in deciding to commence its reclamation projects in 
the South China Sea, was ultimately driven by a desire to increase its power projection 
capabilities in the South China Sea.  This desire predates the internationalization of the 
South China Sea dispute in 2009 and was an outcome of China’s military growth and its 
enhancements to its own power projection capabilities.  The timing of China’s projects, 
in late 2013, however, were proximately caused by a desire to react to its rivals, which 
from China’s perception had grown increasingly willing to confront China on its South 
China Sea sovereignty claims.  These actions by China’s rivals and the overall upsetting 
of the balance quo in the South China Sea served as the catalyst for China’s decision to 
conduct its land reclamation and outpost expansion projects. 
A. IMPORTANCE OF THIS STUDY 
China’s reclamation activities and outpost construction/expansion within the 
Spratlys directly impacts current U.S. policy and interests within the South China Sea.  
According to the statements Admiral Samuel L. Locklear III—former Commander of the 
U.S. Pacific Command—in his testimony before the U.S. House Appropriations 
Committee on March 18, 2015, land reclamation in the South China Sea will have a 
negative impact on regional security, and “will give China the ability for greater 
presence, increase dwell time for military and coast guard assets, and expand the areas 
covered by surveillance and area-denial systems.”4  According to Pham Lan Dun and 
Tran Huu Duy Minh, two leading Vietnamese scholars, “the massive land reclamation 
and construction activities by China have caused tensions and have escalated disputes, 
because it changed the status quo of the dispute.”5 The Spratlys are contested amongst six 
claimants, including the Philippines whom with the United States shares a mutual defense 
treaty.  Actions within these disputed territories by any of the rival claimants has the 
potential to upset the status quo and spark a broader military build-up capable of 
                                                 
4 Admiral Samuel L. Locklear III, U.S. House Appropriations Committee, Hearing, March 18, 2015, 
2–3. 
5 Pham Lan Dung and Tran Huu Duy Minh, “Some Legal Aspects of Current Developments in the 
South China Sea,” in Examining the South China Sea Disputes: Papers from the Fifth Annual CSIS South 
China Sea Conference, ed. Murray Hiebert, Phuong Nguyen, and Gregory B. Polling (New York: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 2015), 67. 
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destabilizing the region.  At the heart of U.S. concern over China’s reclamation efforts is 
if they will negatively affect U.S. interests in the region and decrease regional security by 
providing China with a capability to exert additional combat power into vital South China 
Sea shipping lanes and possibly disrupt the shipping, disrupting the balance of power in 
the South China Sea in favor of China and weakening the claims of rival claimants, 
decreasing U.S. military power and influence in the region, and potentially weakening 
U.S. relationships with other countries in the region.  Additionally, China’s actions in the 
South China Sea can possibly be seen as a way to gauge China’s intentions for the region 
and overall whether China intends to rise peacefully or whether it is intent on assertively 
challenging the status quo and U.S. influence.   
Furthermore, determining the primary drivers behind China’s reclamation activity 
and outpost construction will enhance U.S. understanding of China’s actions and perhaps 
provide some insight into how far China is likely to go in pressing, strengthening, or 
defending its claims.  It is difficult to have an effective response plan that shapes and 
affects China’s behavior without understanding the motivations of that behavior.  With 
better understanding of the reasons behind China’s actions, U.S. policymakers can better 
formulate a tailored response plan that is in line with overarching U.S. objectives and best 
capable of facilitating desired changes to the current environment.  
There are several implications arising from analysis of this subject, and which this 
analysis will aid in answering.  First is how important the reclamation activity is for 
China and the United States in terms of foreign policy and diplomatic relations.  This 
research will shed light on the applications for defense and military activities provided by 
the reclamation.  The research will help in determining the effects of the reclamation on 
the existing status quo of power relationships between China, the United States, and the 
Spratly claimant nations.  It will help in determining whether China’s reclamation has the 
potential to harm US regional interests, adding to the body of knowledge which seeks to 
assist U.S. foreign policy makers in formulating the US response plan.  Finally, the 
research will add to the analysis on the effect that China’s reclamation activity could have 
on US commerce and how likely China would be to decide to close off the South China. 
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B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To understand why China, since roughly 2013, conducted large-scale reclamation 
and outpost expansion at its Spratly Island outposts in the South China Sea, one must 
examine the explanations behind such actions.  At first glance, one could separate the 
drivers behind China’s broader assertiveness in the South China Sea and those drivers 
linked to China’s reclamations activities over the past couple years in the Spratlys; 
however, these drivers are directly linked.  Therefore, in identifying the drivers behind 
China’s reclamation activities that began in 2013, one must also consider the drivers that 
various scholars have argued impact China’s actions in the South China Sea since 
roughly 2009.    
This literature review introduces two prominent explanations for China’s behavior 
in the South China Sea, which are covered more in depth in the subsequent chapters of 
this thesis, as well as summarizes five other explanations scholars have proposed to 
explain China’s behavior in the South China Sea, as well as China’s recent land 
reclamation and outpost expansion projects within the Spratlys.  The other explanations 
covered—which are not be covered in the other chapters of this thesis but which still 
deserve merit and further research and analysis—are: actions as a result of China’s 
increased power, an outcome of Chinese nationalism, an outcome of a rogue PLA, and, 
finally, that China’s actions are benign and aimed at increasing regional maritime 
security.  
1. Reaction to Actions by Other Claimants and the United States 
The first explanation, covered in Chapter III, is that China’s actions are in 
reaction to the actions of the other South China Sea claimants and those of the United 
States.  From this perspective, “Beijing has been more reactive than assertive; it is 
responding to [what it considers] provocative behavior by others [and] to gaps in the 
existing international order.”6 
                                                 
6 Harry Harding, “Has U.S. China Policy Failed?” The Washington Quarterly, Fall (2015), 100. 
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2. Force Projection Enhancement 
The second explanation, covered in Chapter IV, is that China’s actions in the 
South China Sea overall, and more specifically within the Spratlys, are calculated actions 
aimed at increasing its ability to project power within the South China Sea.  China’s 
“efforts in the region reflect a broader set of strategic priorities: to strengthen maritime 
force projection capability; to raise the level of difficulty and cost to any opposing 
military force operating in the region; and to broaden options open to the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) in any future contingency.”7  China commenced its reclamation 
and outpost expansions projects to better defend its southern maritime approaches and 
contested territorial claims, while simultaneously providing a wider array of options 
available for responding to external challenges in the South China Sea.   
3. Result of China’s Increasing Power 
A third explanation, which is not further examined in this thesis, is that China’s 
actions in the South China Sea and in the Spratlys more specifically are arguably a 
reflection of the confidence increased military power affords China’s decision makers, 
providing new and alternative means for China to influence the strategic environment.  
Aaron Freidberg asserts that “the recent increase in Chinese assertiveness…is a result of 
increasingly favorable leadership assessments of the nation’s relative power and of the 
threats and opportunities that it confronts.”8  Phillip Saunders argues that “increasing 
PLA strength means that China now has the ability to demonstrate its military capabilities 
in order to intimidate less powerful countries.”9  From this mindset, China’s reclamation 
activities and outpost construction in the Spratlys could be interpreted as being aimed at 
                                                 
7 Peter Jennings, “The International Community and the Strategic Balance in the South China Sea,” in 
Examining the South China Sea Disputes: Papers from the Fifth Annual CSIS South China Sea Conference, 
ed. Murray Hiebert, Phuong Nguyen, and Gregory B. Polling (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 
51. 
8 Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Sources of Chinese Conduct: Explaining Beijing’s Assertiveness,” The 
Washington Quarterly (Winter 2015): 143. 
9 Phillip C. Saunders, “The Role of the Chinese Military in the South China Sea,” in Perspectives on 
the South China Sea: Diplomatic, Legal, and Security Dimensions of the Dispute, ed. Murray Hiebert, 
Phuong Nguyen, and Gregory B. Polling (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 132. 
 6 
enhancing China’s power vis-à-vis the other South China Sea claimants, thus solidifying 
China’s position as the dominant regional power. 
This explanation is not being covered in the thesis, despite its merit, because the 
explanation is incomplete because it fails to account for the full range of China’s actions 
in the South China Sea and within the Spratlys.  Aaron Friedberg captures probably the 
most salient counterargument to this argument by reflecting on the instances when 
China’s behavior has been restrained in dealing with rival claimants.  Freidberg writes 
that, “following 2010, China did not simply plow ahead with a policy of omnidirectional 
assertiveness, but instead tempered its behavior in certain respects in response to the 
reactions of others. As we have seen, by the end of that year the CCP regime had already 
begun to make conciliatory gestures toward the United States, followed by efforts to 
soothe relations with most members of ASEAN.”10  If China was solely driven by power, 
it would not choose to temper its responses.  This asserts a certain rationality to Chinese 
behavior, as previously covered in the cost-benefit explanation, that seemingly disproves 
any argument that China is singularly driven to assertiveness in the South China Sea and 
elsewhere by its power status. 
4. Nationalism 
A fourth explanation, which is not examined further in this thesis, is that China’s 
reclamation projects were the result of increased nationalism in China.  Many scholars 
assert that nationalism is on the rise in China.  According to Raine and Le Miere, “the 
pride of being a rising or returning power—whose people are repeatedly told about their 
centre-stage role in the twenty-first century—and the memory by that same power of a 
previous ‘century of humiliation,’ provides an important undercurrent for nationalism in 
the South China Sea.”11  Writing about the place that nationalism occupies in Chinese 
society, Susan Shirk writes that “the Communist Party has embraced nationalism as its 
new ideology in an age when almost nobody believes in communism anymore … [and] 
                                                 
10 Friedberg, “The Sources of Chinese Conduct,” 145. 
11 Sarah Raine and Christian Le Miere, Regional Disorder: The South China Sea Disputes (New York: 
Routledge, 2013), 95. 
 7 
whenever the public pays close attention to an issue, leaders feel they have to act tough to 
show how strong they area.”12   
Mark Valencia links nationalism to the Spratly Island issue, writing “that the 
Spratly archipelago has been part of the motherland since ancient times is embedded in 
the national psyche; if, after losing territory to Western powers in the last century, China 
should now lose territory to regional states, national pride and the very legitimacy of the 
government would be severely damaged.”13  
Scholars also argue that there are negatives consequences for Beijing decision-
makers appearing weak on foreign policy issues, including the South China Sea and 
Spratlys.  Aaron Friedberg examines this argument and writes that “territorial disputes 
are important because they involve tangible manifestations of the injustices inflicted on 
China when it was relatively weak; having done so much to call them into existence, the 
regime now arguably finds itself driven and sometimes trapped by strong feelings of 
national pride and resentment.”14  Linda Jakobson correspondingly writes that “Chinese 
leaders are criticized relentlessly for being too weak and bowing to international pressure 
on Chinese internet chat sites, [and] Chinese authorities are keenly aware of how quickly 
this dissatisfaction can give rise to questioning of the CCP’s ability to govern.”15  
There is an ongoing debate as to whether scholars believe that nationalism affects 
Chinese foreign policy decision, and the lack of supporting evidence behind the 
relationship between nationalism and Chinese foreign policy decision-making is why this 
argument will not be one of the explanations covered in the thesis.   
Alastair Ian Johnston challenges nationalism as a driver, stating that “proponents 
of the nationalism argument offer no theory about how popular sentiments are translated 
into foreign policy, [and] the explanation makes an assumption about the hypersensitivity 
                                                 
12 Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 11. 
13 Mark J. Valencia, China and the South China Sea Disputes (London: Oxford University Press, 
1995), 15. 
14 Friedberg, “The Sources of Chinese Conduct,” 138–139. 
15 Linda Jakobson, China’s Unpredictable Maritime Security Actors (Lowy Institute for International 
Policy, 2014), 26. 
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of the top leadership to nationalist public opinion for which there is almost no systematic 
evidence as yet.”16   
Aaron Friedberg takes Johnston’s criticism of nationalism as a driver of China’s 
South China Sea policy one step further, arguing that “there is very little to indicate that, 
at least to date, the leadership has ever felt compelled by public sentiment to take 
positions or pursue policies different than those it might otherwise have chosen; to the 
contrary, the evidence suggests that, in addition to its skill in stirring popular passions, 
the regime has become adept at modulating and directing them to serve its own 
purposes.”17 
5. Rogue PLA 
A fifth explanation, which is not examined further in this thesis, is that China’s 
foreign policy and maritime actions are being guided by China’s military—the PLA—, 
which is operating independently and with little oversight by the central government.  An 
International Crisis Group report describes the PLA, stating that it structurally “sits 
outside of the civilian bureaucracy for South China Sea policy but has the potential to 
undermine the government’s efforts to manage tensions.”18  Alastair Iain Johnston 
highlights the PLA’s relative autonomy, stating that “the PLA has a near monopoly of 
expertise on operational issues and considerable institutional autonomy from other 
civilian institutions; this means there is limited civilian oversight of PLA operational 
activities.”19   
Aaron Friedberg explains how some scholars believe that the PLA uses this 
autonomy to act outside central government direction, stating that “of all the bureaucratic 
actors involved, none has greater prestige or more resources at its disposal than the PLA, 
[and] some analysts speculate that it now plays a larger role in making foreign as well as 
                                                 
16 Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?,” International 
Security 37, no. 4 (2013): 37. 
17  Friedberg, “The Sources of Chinese Conduct,” 141. 
18 International Crisis Group, “Stirring up the South China Sea (I),” Asia Report, no. 223 (23 April 
2012), 15. 
19 Johnston, “How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?,” 41. 
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strictly military policy, with the result that China’s overall posture has shifted toward a 
tougher and more confrontational stance.”20   
This explanation is not worth pursuing further because there is little evidence to 
support this claim.  Some scholars go so far as to argue that evidence supports the 
opposite conclusion—that PLA actions are actually in alignment with central government 
direction and policies.  Alastair Iain Johnston’s argues that the “rogue PLA” theory is 
“speculative” and that “no one really knows the working relationship between the top 
political leadership and the PLA, as one hears different versions in Beijing.”21  He 
continues by stating that, “as an institution, the PLA is not publicly expressing views on 
major policy issues and strategic orientation that are far from the CCP’s message.”22  
Aaron Friedberg raises similar concerns, stating that “there is virtually no evidence of 
significant splits between civilian and military leaders on the most important questions of 
foreign and defense policy; to the contrary, all signs point to the existence of a broad 
consensus on national objectives, strategy, and tactics.”23  
6. Benign and Aimed at Increasing Regional Maritime Security 
A sixth explanation, which is not examined further in this thesis, is that China’s 
actions have been relatively benevolent and aimed at increasing China’s capabilities to 
enforce maritime security in the South China for all relevant nations, a motive in line 
with its status as a great nation and responsible actor.  Arguing on behalf of this 
hypothesis, Wu Shicun writes that “China’s reclamation work in the South China Sea is 
aimed at improving China’s capacity to deliver maritime public services, maintaining 
maritime safety and security, offering support to search and rescue operations and 
scientific research, and improving the living and working conditions of fishermen and 
other people stationed on the islands and reefs; these objectives befit China’s 
                                                 
20 Friedberg, “The Sources of Chinese Conduct,” 140. 
21 Johnston, “How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?,” 39. 
22 Ibid., 42. 
23 Friedberg, “The Sources of Chinese Conduct,” 142. 
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international and regional responsibility as a big country.”24  Ian Storey, in addressing 
China’s position writes that China argues that “the facilities under construction are 
designed … to provide public goods such as search and rescue services, disaster relief, 
marine scientific research, weather forecasting and typhoon shelters for fishermen.”25  
Ben Dolven et al. write that “bases in the Spratlys could enhance China’s ability to 
conduct search and rescue (SAR) operations in surrounding waters.”26 
This explanation does not explain China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea 
nor explain the military applications of the expanded outposts.  China likely will use 
these outposts for the peaceful purposes it proclaims, but these outposts likely will also 
be used for their military applications.  They enhance China’s regional strategic position 
and could provide significant logistical support for any future military activities in the 
southern South China Sea.   
C. HYPOTHESES 
There are two hypotheses that I have chosen to examine in this thesis and which 
help to understand China’s decision to conduct its land reclamation and outpost 
expansion projects in the Spratlys in late 2013.  The first hypothesis and explanation 
examined is that China’s land reclamation has been driven by its need to react to the 
actions of others—namely the other Spratly claimants and the United States.  This 
explanation has the deepest impact on the foreign policy decisions and actions made by 
the United States, as well as the other Spratly claimants, because it effectively argues that 
those foreign policy decisions and actions have the ability to affect, and potentially even 
change, China’s foreign policy decisions.  Additionally, I will explore what has occurred, 
in terms of reclamation and other related actions in the Spratlys by the other claimants, to 
examine the merits of the reactive explanation.  
                                                 
24 Wu Shicun, “Recent Developments in the South China Sea: A Chinese Perspective,” in Examining 
the South China Sea Disputes: Papers from the Fifth Annual CSIS South China Sea Conference, ed. 
Murray Hiebert, Phuong Nguyen, and Gregory B. Polling (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 80.) 
25 Ian Storey, “China’s Terraforming in the Spratlys: A Game Changer in the South China Sea?,” 
ISEAS Perspective 29 (2015): 4. 
26 Dolven et al., Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea, 10. 
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The second hypothesis and explanation examined is China’s reclamation and 
outpost expansion is part of a strategic calculation in which China is seeking to enhance 
its capabilities to project military power in the South China Sea and in the region.  This 
explanation focuses on the power projection enhancement motivations behind the 
creation of these expanded outposts.  This explanation also examines the benefits such 
bases will provide the People’s Liberation Army as well as the China Coast Guard in 
performing their duties in order to better discern China’s motivations.  I also will 
examine how these new outposts will affect that status quo among the various claimants 
from a military capabilities standpoint. 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
In order to assess the value of the explanations provided by leading scholars on 
the subject, I have focused on the two explanation that I have determined to be most 
prominent and best able to describe China’s behaviors.  To further examine the merit of 
these two explanations, I have conducted a thorough exploration of the supporting 
evidence in order to determine the strength of the explanations and the extent to which 
these explanations are able to provide an understanding as to why China is acting the way 
that it is in the South China Sea.  For the reactiveness explanation, evidence of actions by 
other rival claimants and/or the U.S. that occurs prior to China’s land reclamation and can 
be either directly or indirectly linked to subsequent actions by China will bolster the merit 
of this explanation, whereas evidence that China’s actions are either deemed to have been 
disproportionate, pre-planned, or poorly associated to specific actions taken by the US or 
a rival claimant hurts the merits of this explanation.  Regarding the explanation that 
China’s actions are the result of a strategic calculation on the part of China whereas it 
sees the reclamation and outpost expansion as necessary to achieve a goal of projection 
additional military power in the South China Sea region, evidence supporting the claim 
that these outposts will provide significant benefits to China’s military and paramilitary 
forces as well as enhance its ability to project power abroad will support this argument.  
Evidence that determines that such impacts will not enhance China’s capabilities in these 
regards, or that reclamation will spur a regional arms buildup that will negate any relative 
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advantage China would stand to gain from its reclamation activities would weaken the 
argument.   
For both of these explanations, I have examined the timeline of events 
surrounding China’s reclamation to look for associations between China’s actions and the 
actions of others, as well look for any evidence to suggest that China’s actions are part of 
a much larger trend of increasing Chinese militarization of the Spratlys.  Additionally, I 
have examined what Chinese officials and leading scholars have said about the 
reclamation in order to discern whether what China has effectively been saying matches 
up with the reality of what is occurring in the South China Sea.  Finally, I also have 
explored the depth of China’s reclamation and outpost construction activities in order to 
best determine what these outposts likely will be used for, which will shed light on 
China’s reasoning for conducting the activities in the first place. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The main findings of this thesis are that China’s decision in 2013 to commence its 
reclamation and outpost expansion projects in the Spratlys was the result of both 
explanations.  The timing of China’s decision was driven by a desire to react to its rivals 
and the overall upsetting of the status quo in the South China Sea.  Ultimately, however, 
China’s actions were driven by a desire to increase its power projection capabilities both 
inside and outside the region.  These new outposts will significantly enhance China’s 
power projection capabilities, especially in the South China Sea region. 
This thesis is organized in four additional chapters.  The second chapter briefly 
highlights the importance of the Spratlys and surrounding South China Sea waters, 
provides a summary of what China has done as far as reclamation and outpost expansion 
within the South China Sea, and summarizes the primary events leading up to the 
reclamation work in 2013 that have characterized China’s assertive behavior in the South 
China Sea since 2009.  The third chapter focuses on the first explanation to describe 
China’s Spratly Island reclamation and outpost expansion projects—that China’s actions 
have largely been in reaction to the actions of others.  The fourth chapter focuses on the 
second explanation—that China’s actions are the result of a strategic calculation whereas 
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China has determined these actions to be necessary to facilitate power projection in the 
South China Sea.  The fifth and final chapter serves as the conclusion to the thesis and 
weighs the evidence for each explanation and identifies implications of the findings for 
future Chinese behaviors in the South China Sea and for U.S. policy there.   
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II. CHINA’S LAND RECLAMATION ACTIVITIES 
China, beginning in roughly late 2013, commenced large-scale reclamation and 
construction projects on its seven controlled reefs within the Spratlys (see Figure 1).  The 
precise commencement date is unclear and the rough start time is based on initial 
discovery of reclamation efforts by China in the Spratlys via imagery.  This reclamation 
activity has occurred during a period, which roughly began in 2009, in which China has 
been perceived by its neighbors and the United States as acting aggressively in how it has 
acted in matters concerning the South China Sea.  In this chapter I will briefly highlight 
the importance of the Spratlys and surrounding South China Sea waters, and summarize 
the reclamation and construction that China has conducted and the primary events leading 
up to the reclamation work in 2013 that have characterized China’s assertive behavior in 
the South China Sea since 2009. 
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Figure 1.  Locations of Chinese Reclamation Sites in the Spratlys27 
A. SIGNIFICANCE 
The Spratlys are strategically located in the southern portion of the South China 
Sea, and “each of the areas under reclamation—including Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross 
Reef, Gaven Reef, Hughes Reef, Johnson South Reef, Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef—is 
disputed between China and at least one other claimant, including the Philippines, 
Vietnam, Malaysia, and Taiwan.”28  Ownership of the Spratly Islands group within the 
South China Sea is disputed among six countries—Brunei, China, Malaysia, the 
                                                 
27 Source: Dolven et al., Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea, 3. 
28 Ibid., 4. 
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Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam—which all have made individual, and often 
overlapping, claims to at least a portion of these disputed waters (see Figure 2).     
 
Figure 2.  Depiction of Occupied Territories and Overlapping Claims 
in the Spratlys29 
The Spratlys are a group of maritime features, including reefs, banks, and cays.  
Most of these features are either completely submerged under water or partially 
submerged with some portion of the feature sticking out above water at low tide.  The 
claimant nations have established military outposts on some of these islands, reefs, and 
other maritime features.   
The South China Sea is arguably host to an abundance of natural resources, and 
the claim to the waters around these islands, reefs, and other maritime features is worth a 
                                                 
29 Source: Dolven et al., Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea, 18. 
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considerable amount if a country’s claim to them is ever internationally recognized and a 
country is therefore able to exploit the resources in the area.  The South China Sea is 
believed to hold significant reserves of both oil and natural gas in addition to its valuable 
fishing resources.  According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, there are 
approximately 11 billion barrels of oil in the South China Sea out of an estimated 1.47 
trillion barrels worldwide and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in the South China Sea 
out of an estimated 6.7 quadrillion cubic feet worldwide.30  Alan Dupont, writing on the 
linkages between the claims to the territories and resources, states that the “occupation 
and demonstrated connections with these maritime features are considered by the 
claimants…to be part of their respective territorial claims including control of the 
underlying oil, gas, and marine living resources.”31 
Perhaps even more importantly, the Spratlys are also situated near vital shipping 
lanes that connect East Asia westward to the rest of the world.  Dupont, writing on the 
strategic importance of the South China Sea to maritime trade, writes that “the South 
China Sea has long been a maritime highway for intra-Asian trade, commerce, and 
contact, as well as a bridge to Europe and the Middle East, but its strategic and trade 
significance now exceeds that of all other seas because of Asia’s rise and the enormous 
and increasing volumes of trade and energy that flow through it to and from the rest of 
the world.”32  Raine and Le Miere write that the South China Sea “carries more than half 
of the world’s annual merchant-fleet tonnage and a third of all maritime traffic; a growing 
dynamic of intra-regional as well as inter-regional trade ensures a regular flow of raw 
materials and commodities across its waters, enveloping both Southeast and Northeast 
Asia in concerns over sea lines of communications (SLOCs) within these waters.”33  
Similarly, Dupont writes that “the South China Sea carries more than 40 percent of world 
trade and 50 percent of energy trade, with the gateway Malacca Strait having overtaken 
                                                 
30 “China’s Maritime Disputes,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed December 7, 2016, 
http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/. 
31 Alan Dupont, “Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea: ASEAN’s Dilemma,” in Perspectives on 
the South China Sea: Diplomatic, Legal, and Security Dimensions of the Dispute, ed. Murray Hiebert, 
Phuong Nguyen, and Gregory B. Polling (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 46. 
32 Ibid., 45. 
33 Raine and Le Miere, Regional Disorder, 12. 
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the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal, and the Straits of Hormuz as the world’s most critical 
waterway, [and] the amount of oil exported through the Malacca Strait is triple that 
through the Suez Canal and 15 times greater than the volume of oil that transits the 
Panama Canal.”34   
B. OVERVIEW OF CHINESE RECLAMATION AND OUTPOST 
EXPANSION 
Since reclamation work began in 2013, China has reclaimed approximately 3,200 
total acres of new land at its seven controlled territories within the Spratlys, according to 
the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative.35  Putting in context the total amount of land 
reclaimed during a May 30, 2015, speech, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter said 
that China had reclaimed “more than all other claimants combined...and more than in the 
entire history of the region.”36  While Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines have all 
conducted their own reclamation efforts around the outposts and maritime features that 
they claim and maintain de facto control of within the Spratlys, these efforts are 
significantly less in comparison to what China has accomplished over the last two years. 
To date, 976 acres have been reclaimed at Subi Reef (see Figure 3), 1,379 acres at 
Mischief Reef (see Figure 4), 27 acres at Johnson Reef (see Figure 5), 19 acres at Hughes 
Reef (see Figure 6), 34 acres at Gaven Reefs (see Figure 7), 677 acres at Fiery Cross Reef 
(see Figure 8), and 56 acres at Cuarteron Reef (see Figure 9).37  On June 16, 2015, a 
China Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson announced that China was concluding its 
reclamation work, stating that, “as planned, the land reclamation project of China’s 
construction on some stationed islands and reefs of the Nansha Islands will be completed 
in the upcoming days.”38 
                                                 
34 Dupont, “Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea,” 45–46. 
35 “Chinese Occupied Features,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, accessed October 24, 2016, 
https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/chinese-occupied-features/. 
36 Dolven et al., Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea, 4. 
37 “Chinese Occupied Features,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. 
38 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman Lu 
Kang’s Remarks on Issues Relating to China’s Construction Activities on the Nansha Islands and Reefs,” 




Figure 3.  Subi Reef—24 July 201639 
                                                 
39 Source: “Chinese Occupied Features,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. 
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Figure 4.  Mischief Reef—22 July 201640 
                                                 
40 Source: “Chinese Occupied Features,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. 
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Figure 5.  Johnson Reef—09 February 201641 
                                                 
41 Source: “Chinese Occupied Features,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. 
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Figure 6.  Hughes Reef—07 February 201642 
 
Figure 7.  Gaven Reefs—12 February 201643 
                                                 
42 Source: “Chinese Occupied Features,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. 
43 Source: “Chinese Occupied Features,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. 
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Figure 8.  Fiery Cross Reef—03 June 201644 
 
Figure 9.  Cuarteron Reef—24 January 201645  
                                                 
44 Source: “Chinese Occupied Features,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. 
45 Source: “Chinese Occupied Features,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. 
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China is currently constructing minor military bases on the islands that 
accommodate port facilities and airfields of varying sizes.46  Bonnie Glaser writes that, 
“as islands are completed, China is erecting buildings, deploying troops, building harbors 
and airstrips, and installing radar and surveillance systems.”47  At Fiery Cross Reef, 
China’s largest reclamation site in the Spratlys, China has constructed “an airstrip that is 
long enough to allow the country to land any plane, from fighter jets to large transport 
aircraft.”48  China has also constructed airstrips at Subi Reef and Mischief Reef, and 
“civilian planes landed on Subi and Mischief reefs for the first time on July 12, giving 
China three operational runways in the disputed Spratly Islands.”49 At each these three 
reclaimed islands upon which China has constructed airfields, it is assessed that China 
will “have hangar space for 24 fighter-jets plus 3–4 larger planes.”50  
C. HIGHLIGHTED EVENTS LEADING UP TO CHINA’S RECLAMATION 
PROJECTS 
Before China commenced its island reclamation and outpost expansion projects in 
the Spratlys in late 2013, the situation in the South China Sea had devolved into a wider 
regional crisis amongst the rival claimant nations.  There were several incidents, 
beginning in 2009, that characterize this negative trend toward heightened regional 
disputes over ownership of and rights within the disputes waters and territories of the 
South China Sea.  The ones I have deemed to be most critical, and which will be briefly 
summarized in the paragraphs that follow, are China’s 2009 submission of its maritime 
claims in the South China Sea to the United Nations, the 2012 Scarborough Shoal 
incident, the 2013 Philippines-initiated arbitration case, the 2014 Second Thomas Shoal 
incident, and the 2014 Chinese oil rig incident. 
                                                 
46 Watkins, “What China Has Been Building in the South China Sea.” 
47 Bonnie S. Glaser, “China’s Island Building in the Spratly Islands: For What Purpose?,” in 
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50 Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “Build it and They Will Come.” 
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China claims that it has indisputable sovereignty over a large portion of the South 
China Sea, including the disputed Spratlys.  While many of the islands, reefs, and 
maritime features within the Spratlys were occupied by the different claimant nations in 
the 1980s, China officially notified the other nations of its claims over the entirety of the 
islands in 2009, when two Notes Verbales were sent to the UN Secretary General with a 
request that they be given to all UN member states.  The notes “contained China’s 
objections to the submissions by Vietnam and Malaysia (jointly) and Vietnam 
(individually) to the [United Nations] Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf.”51  Furthermore, the notes relayed China’s official position that it “has 
indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, 
and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed 
and subsoil thereof.”52  The two notes were issued alongside a map that depicted nine 
dashed lines drawn around the majority of the South China Sea; this marked China’s first 
use of its ‘Nine Dashed Line’ claim to the South China Sea and everything within it, 
including the disputed Spratlys.  To date, China has not yet clarified the full extent or 
legality of its Nine Dashed Line claim over the South China Sea.   
In April 2012, a confrontation between China and the Philippines occurred at the 
contested Scarborough Shoal when the Philippines responded to what they saw as illegal 
Chinese fishing there by deploying the Gregio del Pilar Philippine coast guard cutter to 
arrest the Chinese fishermen.53  Chinese maritime law enforcement vessels arrived and 
placed themselves between the Chinese fishing vessels and the Gregio del Pilar to 
impede its efforts to arrest the Chinese fishermen, resulting in a maritime stand-off 
between ships belonging to both countries.  The result was that the Philippines recalled 
their coast guard cutter but China maintained, and continues to do so, a maritime law 
enforcement presence at Scarborough Shoal, essentially seizing control of the territory 
                                                 
51 United States Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and 
Scientific Affairs, “China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea,” Limits in the Seas, no. 143 (2014), 1, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/234936.pdf. 
52 United States Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and 
Scientific Affairs, “China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea,” 1. 
53 Dupont, “Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea,” 47. 
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from the Philippines.54  This incident remains unresolved, though China appears to have 
asserted de fact control over the territory. 
In January 2013, the Philippines initiated an arbitration case against China that 
was settled by a United Nations international tribunal at The Hague.  China declined to 
participate in the case, refusing to recognize the court’s jurisdiction over the issue.  The 
case was settled in July 2016, largely in favor of the Philippines.  The tribunal ruled that 
“that there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea 
areas falling within the ‘nine-dash line.’”55  The tribunal ruled that “none of the features 
claimed by China was capable of generating an exclusive economic zone.”56  The 
tribunal also stated that China had “violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights in its 
exclusive economic zone by (a) interfering with Philippine fishing and petroleum 
exploration, (b) constructing artificial islands and (c) failing to prevent Chinese fishermen 
from fishing in the zone.”57 
In March 2014, a maritime incident between China and the Philippines occurred 
at Second Thomas Shoal (for location, see Figure 2).  Chinese maritime law enforcement 
ships entered the surrounding waters in order to deter the Philippines from resupplying 
their military outpost there, which is a deteriorating World War 2-era LST that the 
Philippine Navy grounded there in 1999 and has since used as its outpost.  This incident 
resulted in a standoff between China and the Philippines.  Glaser summarizes the event as 
an incident where “where Chinese coast guard vessels have attempted to thwart the 
delivery of supplies to Filipino marines deployed on a rusting warship that has been in 
place since it was deliberately beached on the submerged reef in 1999.”58  According to 
Dupont, “resupply ships from the Philippines have since been chased away by Chinese 
paramilitary shups, making it abundantly clear that this reef also falls within China’s 
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ambit claim to more than 80 percent of the South China Sea.”59  China maintains a Coast 
Guard vessel presence in the area and this incident remains unresolved. 
In May 2014, China deployed a nearly US$1 billion deep-sea mega oil rig, 
Haiyang Shiyou 981, to a location “around 17 nautical miles from Triton, about 120 
nautical miles from Vietnam’s Ly So Island, and about 180 nautical miles from Hainan 
Island.”60  This was an attempt by China to conduct oil and natural gas exploration in 
waters disputed between China and Vietnam, resulting in an incident pitting Chinese and 
Vietnamese paramilitary ships against each other.  During the incident, “China declared a 
3 nautical mile security radius around the oil rig” and used its ships to form a protective 
ring around the oil rig and to ward off intervention in its operations by Vietnamese Coast 
Guard ships.61  Vu Hai Dang described the incident as “constant, if not daily, 
confrontation between Vietnamese and Chinese vessels, [and] these confrontations 
consist of ships chasing, running into each other, colliding, ramming, and firing water 
cannons.”62  Additionally, “beginning May 11, Vietnam erupted in anti-China protests, 
[and] the protests resulted in Chinese businesses being harassed and attacked; several 
foreign-owned factories were damaged as part of the protests.”63  China withdrew the rig 
in July 2014, marking the end of the incident. 
These events over the past several years represent the general trend toward a 
heightening of tensions between the rival claimants in the South China Sea that have 
generally been characterized as a regional crisis.  China’s reclamation and outpost 
expansion projects in the South China Sea are the latest in this series of events, whether 
China intended this to be the case or not. 
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III. THE REACTIVE EXPLANATION FOR CHINESE SPRATLY 
RECLAMATION 
One explanation for China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea, including 
its land reclamation and outpost expansion projects in the Spratlys, is that China’s actions 
are in reaction to the provocative actions taken by the other South China Sea claimants 
and the United States.  Furthermore, these provocative actions have forced China to react.  
From this perspective, “Beijing has been more reactive than assertive; it is responding to 
provocative behavior by others, to gaps in the existing international order, and to the 
limits that others have placed on Beijing’s role in international financial institutions.”64   
From the Chinese perspective, China was content with the status quo in the South 
China Sea and only when pushed to defend its claims by its neighbors, emboldened by 
outside parties such as the United States, has China responded in ways that have been 
deemed to have been assertive in nature.  Authors Sarah Raine and Christian Le Miere 
write that “some have identified a Chinese policy of ‘reactive assertiveness,’ whereby 
Beijing has not looked to force the pace on contentious issues but rather robustly to 
defend its standpoint when others have come encroaching.”65   
In this chapter I will examine and assess the evidence supporting the reactive 
argument, including both the actions taken by China’s rival Spratly claimants and the 
United States, as well as official statements from Chinese leadership and both Chinese 
and Western scholars on the subject.  First, I will examine the overarching reactive 
argument and supporting evidence as provided by many Chinese officials and scholars 
that support the interpretation that China’s assertive behavior since 2009 has largely been 
in response to the provocative actions taken by China’s rival claimants and the United 
States.  I have grouped the supporting evidence for the overarching reactive explanation 
into five sections: the submission of maritime claims and arbitration case, national 
legislation, incidents at sea, a breakdown in regional dispute settlement, and interference 
by the United States.  I will then apply the reactive argument to China’s decision to 
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conduct extensive land reclamation and outpost expansion at all its Spratly outposts 
beginning in 2013.  
Finally, I will conclude with my analysis of the both the Chinese reactive 
arguments and it supporting evidence, both in the context of the greater South China Sea 
conflict and as it applies to China’s Spratly reclamation.  I argue the following: first, 
since 2009 but before reclamation work commenced in roughly late 2013, there is strong 
and clear evidence to support the argument that China’s assertive actions in the South 
China Sea have, at least in part, been in response to the actions of others, despite China’s 
decision to often respond disproportionally.  Second, in the case of China’s Spratly 
reclamation, there was not a clear proximate provocation undertaken by one of the 
claimants that explains the timing of the reclamation or the need to commence the 
reclamation projects in 2013, despite China’s overarching grievances with the actions of 
its rivals that have upset regional stability and the status quo in the Spratlys.  China’s 
Spratly reclamation and outpost expansion projects are aimed at preventing any further 
disruptions to the balance of power in the Spratlys and safeguarding China’s claims and 
interests in the region. 
A. BROADER APPLICATION TO PAST SOUTH CHINA SEA BEHAVIOR 
Something changed in 2009 when China’s actions in the South China Sea became 
more assertive amidst a general change in balance and status-quo in the region that had 
been achieved through the 1990s and which culminated in the 2002 Declaration of 
Conduct.  A regional dispute over claims to the Spratlys is not new, but from the Chinese 
perspective, the rival claimants had managed to address the situation peacefully without 
the conflict transforming into a regional crisis.  At the most basic level, the reactive 
argument is that the peaceful status-quo in the South China Sea was upset by the actions 
of other regional claimants and the involvement of the United States, forcing China to act 
more assertively to restore the status quo and regional stability.  In this section, I will 
examine statements and supporting evidence of the Chinese reactive argument provided 
by Chinese officials and experts, and some American analysts, that emphasize the 
provocative actions by others that have forced China to react by defending its maritime 
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interests and that the source of instability is in the actions by others.  Additionally, I will 
examine and assess the evidence behind the Chinese interpretation of the events leading 
up to this current South China Sea crisis. 
The Spratly dispute has been ongoing for at several decades, but the rival 
claimants had managed to achieve a status quo in the dispute without it devolving into a 
greater regional conflict.  According to Zhang Haiwen, the director general of the 
Department of International Cooperation at China’s State Oceanic Administration, the 
South China Sea dispute “has existed for decades before it became a regional hotspot 
issue.”66  Xu Bu, the Chinese Ambassador to ASEAN, writes that “China and some 
littoral countries of the South China Sea have had disputes over territorial and maritime 
interests for more than three decades, but China and the relevant claimant countries have 
managed to address differences and control risks, not letting the issue hinder the 
sustained growth of bilateral ties among them and China-ASEAN relations at large.”67  
Chu Shulong writes that “the Chinese believe that the situation in the South China Sea, 
including territorial disputes, has been basically stable and peaceful since 2002, when 
China and ASEAN reached an agreement on the DOC.”68   
From the Chinese perspective, the dispute over the Spratlys, since the beginning, 
has been due to the assertive actions by the other Spratly claimants.  According to Zhang, 
“the South China Sea dispute began in [the] 1970s [and] since then, contesting states like 
Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia have invaded some islands and reefs of the 
Nansha Islands of China, causing the South China Sea dispute.”69  The Nansha Islands is 
the Chinese name for the Spratlys. 
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Chinese scholars and officials also assert that China has and remains committed to 
peaceful management of a status quo in the Spratlys, but that China’s peaceful approach 
toward its neighbors has been taken advantage of.  Zhang accuses the other Spratly Island 
claimants of “taking advantage” of China when, in the 1990s, it was more focused on 
maintaining regional stability.70  Despite China’s peaceful approach, Zhang claims that 
the rival claimants “intensified their infringing activities in the South China Sea, not only 
by consolidating and building on the illegally-occupied island and reefs, but also by 
continuously introducing western oil and gas companies to grasp oil and gas resources in 
the South China Sea.”71 Similarly, Chinese scholars Fu Ying and Wu Shicun argue that 
“in nearly ten years after the introduction of the DOC, China was the only keen abider of 
the document, [and] it refrained from taking actions that might escalate the dispute in the 
South China Sea and kept pushing for peace and cooperation and joint development in 
disputed areas.”72  
Addressing claims that China has stepped up its naval and paramilitary presence 
in the South China Sea and near the Spratlys, Swaine and Fravel once again provide the 
reactive argument.  They acknowledge that “China has increased its overall presence and 
deployed a greater number of more sophisticated military, fisheries administration, and 
State Oceanographic Administration marine surveillance vessels in the South China Sea 
since roughly 2005 … [and] taken more direct action against other claimants” but, that 
“these activities…have taken place in response to what China views as growing and more 
assertive challenges to its claim occurring since roughly 2007, challenges that require a 
response in turn.”73  Zhang asserts that the United States misinterpreted “China’s 
countermeasures to the offensive activities of Vietnam and the Philippines…as China’s 
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expansion in the South China Sea” and “China’s legitimate claim for rights in the South 
China Sea as a kind of ‘threat’ which might evolve into a large-scale military conflict.”74 
Another component of the reactive argument is that China has not changed its 
commitment to stability and maintenance of a South China Sea status quo, but has only 
had to react more frequently and more aggressively because of actions taken by China’s 
rivals that have prompted an assertive Chinese response.  Swaine and Fravel explain the 
rationale behind China’s overarching reactive strategy, stating that “China has not altered 
its basic, longstanding two-sided strategy of a) avoiding conflict while deferring the 
resolution of difficult disputes in favor of negotiation and cautious management, while b) 
maintaining a resolute defense against perceived attempts by others to undermine China’s 
diplomatic, legal, political, economic, and military position.”75  Furthermore, Alastair 
Iain Johnston writes that China’s actions are “in response to more proactive diplomacy by 
other claimants to establish the legal boundaries of their claims in the region.”76 
In justifying its actions as reactive, China has primarily emphasized behaviors by 
Vietnam and the Philippines.  Chu Shulong captures the Chinese belief that widespread 
criticism of its actions by the United States is unfair, writing that “for more than 20 years, 
Vietnam has been exploiting oil and gas resources in the disputed areas with China in the 
South China Sea, yet the United States never said anything about unilateral actions taken 
in disputed areas by the Vietnamese.”77  Swaine and Fravel assert that “more generally, 
China has sought to grapple with Vietnam‘s declared strategy of internationalizing the 
dispute launched at the end of 2009, namely, efforts to draw attention to and support from 
the international community for Vietnam’s claims.”78  According to Wu Xinbo, professor 
and deputy director at the Center for American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, 
“as both the Philippines and Vietnam try to take advantage of the US pivot to push their 
respective claims in the South China Sea, Beijing is applying a tit-for-tat strategy,” and, 
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“by standing firm against the Philippines and Vietnam, Beijing is sending a signal to 
Manila and Hanoi that they should not expect to push China around in the South China 
Sea with US assistance.”79 
The Chinese narrative for the change in its behaviors can be summarized as being 
the victim in this period of heightened tensions that roughly began in 2009. It has been 
forced to both respond and respond aggressively to defend its claims and interests.  It is 
clear that China has a grievance with the recent action taken by its rivals.  
1. Examining the Evidence 
Wu Shicun, the president of the National Institute for South China Sea, attributes 
the evolution of the South China Sea dispute into an international crisis as being due to 
five interrelated factors: the initial submission of maritime claims and Philippine-initiated 
arbitration case, national legislation, maritime incidents, a breakdown in dispute 
settlement, and involvement and interference by the United States.80 I will use his factors 
as a framework to examine the basis for the Chinese claim that its actions were spurred 
by the actions of others. 
a. Submission of Maritime Claims and Arbitration Case 
The first section of evidence surrounds the assertion that the relatively peaceful, 
status quo in the region was upset in the diplomatic realm with the 2009 submission of 
maritime claims by Vietnam and Malaysia, as well the 2013 arbitration case submitted by 
the Philippines and which has recently been decided in favor of the Philippines.  The 
evidence here is strong in that, in these two examples, China’s rival claimants acted first.  
Aaron Friedberg asserts that China’s maritime claims submissions in 2009 were 
“part of a larger diplomatic and legal game in which other states … made the opening 
moves.”81  According to Wu, “information submitted by states to the Commission on the 
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Limits of the Continental Shelf … is rightly seen as a trigger for the deterioration in the 
situation since 2009.”82  In 2009, Spratly claimants “made submissions to the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to reserve their rights for possible 
continental shelf clams beyond 200nm.”83  Swaine and Fravel assert that China’s first 
maritime claims submission in 2009 through a Note Verbale to the Secretary General of 
the United Nations “was a reaction to submissions to the UN’s Commission on the Limits 
of the Continental Shelf made by Malaysia and Vietnam, which were in turn taken in 
response to a UN deadline for nations to submit technical information on claims to 
extended continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles.”84  Wu, commenting on the 
initial claims submitted by Malaysia and Vietnam asserts that China’s submissions 
“reignited the tension” in the South China Sea dispute.85 
Swaine and Fravel argue that the maritime claims were “congruent with China’s 
longstanding position on the issue,” and “were all taken in response to requests for 
information made by the UN with specific deadlines or in reaction to the actions of other 
nations.”86  Swaine and Fravel argue that China’s subsequent “preliminary declaration of 
claims to an extended continental shelf” in 2009 was “submitted in response to a UN 
request to present claims for ECS [(extended continental shelves)] by May 13, 2009.”87  
Finally, Swaine and Fravel contend that China’s April 2011 Note Verbale submitted to 
the UN was “submitted in response to a Note Verbale submitted by the Philippines in 
April 2011 objecting to China’s May 2009 Note Verbale and the dotted-line map.”88 
Furthermore, the dispute was internationalized further when, “on 22 January 
2013, the Philippines sent China a note verbale, attached with a notification, to initiate 
international arbitration proceedings against China regarding SCS issues.”89  After 
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rejection by China, “the Philippines then unilaterally submitted the SCS dispute to a 
UNCLOS Annex VI arbitral submission.”90  Despite China proclaiming that it would not 
abide by any resolutions coming out of the arbitration, and it hasn’t since the case was 
resolved in favor of the Philippines, the highly publicized case has only exacerbated the 
South China Sea dispute. 
b. National Legislation 
The second section of evidence surrounds rival national legislation that has only 
served to add additional tension and nationalistic fervor to the dispute.  According to Wu, 
the dispute was further propelled into a crisis by national legislation passed by Vietnam 
and the Philippines.91 With regards to the Philippines, Wu points to February 2009, when 
the Philippine Congress “passed Republic Act No. 9522, incorporating Huangyan Island 
and several of the Nansha Islands for the first time, in order to consolidate its claims on 
those features.”92 Huangyan Island is the Chinese name for Scarborough Shoal.  Wu also 
highlights when, on 5 September 2012, “Philippine President Benigno S. Aquino III 
signed Administrative Order No. 29, officially naming portions of the South China Sea 
west of the Philippine archipelagos as the West Philippine Sea, and instructed the 
national mapping authority to produce and publish a new official map in a bid to support 
the Philippine claim to certain islands and reefs and their adjacent waters in the SCS.”93 
With regard to Vietnam, Wu points to when on June 21, 2012, the Vietnamese 
president “officially announced the approval of the Law of the Sea of Vietnam, amid 
escalating tensions in the region; the law explicitly refers to the Xisha and Nansha 
Islands, and entered into force from January 2013.”94  According to Wu, it was in 
“reaction to Vietnam’s move of enacting domestic laws” that “China’s Ministry of Civil 
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Affairs announced the State Council’s approval of the establishment of Sansha City on 
Yongxing Island (Woody Island).”95 
c. Incidents at Sea 
The third section of evidence surrounds the incidents at sea that Chinese officials 
and scholars believe have also further fueled tensions within the broader South China Sea 
crisis.  Wu attributes crisis escalation in the South China Sea to being exacerbated by a 
series of maritime incidents amongst the rival claimants and China, as well as between 
China and the United States.  In these incidents, the Chinese perspective argues that they 
were all initiated by others, compelling China to respond.  These incidents at sea include 
a June 2009 incident between Chinese fishing boats and a Vietnamese oil-exploring 
vessel that resulted in the Vietnamese oil-exploring vessel having its cables cut, a May 
26, 2011 incident between a Vietnamese oil survey ship and Chinese maritime patrol 
vessels that resulted in the Chinese ships “cutting the cables of a Vietnamese oil survey 
ship,” and the Scarborough Shoal incident between China and the Philippines that began 
in April 2012 and ended in Chinese expulsion of Philippine ships from the area and 
establishment of de facto Chinese control over the Scarborough Shoal.96 According to 
Wu, representing the Chinese perspective, the Scarborough Shoal incident was instigated 
by the Philippines when “a Philippine warship entered waters off Huangyan Island 
(Scarborough Shoal) and its soldiers boarded and searched Chinese fishing boats seeking 
shelter from bad weather in the lagoon.”97   
Wu also claims that the highly publicized 2009 USNS IMPECCABLE incident, 
which was marked by a series of unsafe and unprecedented reactions by several Chinese 
ships in the vicinity of USNS ship, was the fault of the United States.  Wu asserts that 
“U.S. activities were to a large extent responsible for the escalation of tension in the 
South China Sea; the United States conflates these intelligence, surveillance, and 
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reconnaissance activities with commercial navigation.”98  From the Chinese perspective, 
the incident was the result of Chinese protest over U.S. surveillance near China’s coast.  
Wu asserts the incident was caused by a disagreement with the United States over 
whether a nation has the “freedom to conduct military research and other survey activities 
in a foreign state’s EEZ.”99  Swaine and Fravel highlight China’s opposition to U.S. 
surveillance activities in the vicinity of the Chinese mainland, which China deems illegal, 
writing that “the Chinese government argues that foreign military vessels must provide 
prior notification before entering an EEZ and that foreign military activities involving 
hydrography, surveys, and intelligence gathering within the EEZ are illegal because they 
signify hostile intent and thus violate the―peaceful purposes provisions of 
UNCLOS.”100  Furthermore, they claim that “from Beijing‘s perspective, the above 
interpretation has provided a legal underpinning to the official statements and actions 
China has taken over the past decade opposing the activities of U.S. military platforms 
operating within China‘s EEZ.”101  
d. Breakdown in Regional Dispute Settlement  
The fourth section of supporting evidence surrounds the attribution of blame for 
the evolution of the South China Sea conflict into a crisis on a lack of ability in the 
relevant South China Sea parties to peacefully manage their dispute.  From the Chinese 
perspective, there was a break-down in regional dispute settlement that had begun with 
the signing of the 2002 ASEAN declaration on the conduct of parties (DOC), 
“confirming the signatories’ intent to promote pragmatic cooperation and ultimately 
reach a code of conduct in the South China Sea.”102  According to Wu Shicun, “the South 
China Sea has long been considered as one of the flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific region,” 
but “there was a precious peaceful time in the region from 2002 to 2009, mainly due to 
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the political framework provided by the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the 
South China Sea between China and ASEAN.”103 
Despite this initial success, the rival claimants were unable to capitalize on the 
declaration and come to agreement on a more binding South China Sea code of conduct 
as the ASEAN members became entangled in the South China Sea dispute.  From the 
Chinese perspective, this has been because the other parties have failed to abide by the 
agreement, leading to a breakdown in adherence to the status quo.  Wu writes that 
“despite all efforts, 2012 witnessed failure to issue a joint communique at the ASEAN 
Regional Forum in July—the first such failure in ASEAN’s 45-year history, and resulting 
from divergence over whether the Huangyan Island standoff should be included.”104   
Wu pins the blame on this failure on the Philippines and Vietnam, who he asserts 
had “been urging ASEAN countries to speak with one voice against China.”105 Zhang 
points to the Philippines as a driver behind the escalation of the South China Sea dispute, 
stating that “within ASEAN, the Philippines spare[s] no effort to force other ASEAN 
countries to unite with them and to stand against China.”106  According to Zhang, in 
“taking advantage of the South China Sea dispute as a ‘tool,’ the United States, together 
with Vietnam and the Philippines, make use of a series of meetings of the ASEAN Forum 
and jointly try to create an illusion that China ‘starts to carry out maritime expansion’ and 
‘tries to change the current situation of the South China Sea unilaterally’ so as to perplex 
the ASEAN countries and to induce them to oppose China.”107  Additionally, Chinese 
officials and scholars points to actions by the other Spratly claimants, including land 
reclamation and outpost expansion, as being in violation of the spirit, if not exact 
wording, of the 2002 DOC.  The land reclamation in the Spratlys by China’s rival 
claimants, which support this argument, will be addressed in a later section.   
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e. Interference by the United States 
The fifth section of supporting evidence will examine evidence supporting claims 
by Chinese officials and scholars alike that point to interference in the South China Sea 
dispute by the United States as one, if not the, primary catalyst for escalation into the 
crisis it has become.  From the Chinese perspective it was a change in U.S. policy in the 
Asia Pacific region, beginning much earlier than the 2011 proclaimed U.S. rebalance to 
Asia, that prompted the change in China’s behavior in 2009, and the United States is “the 
invisible hand behind the rising tension in the South China Sea … [and] is increasingly 
targeting at China as it steps up its Asia-Pacific rebalance strategy.”108  Chinese scholars 
Fu Ying and Wu Shicun write that “in China, it is widely believed that it is the US’s 
Asia–Pacific rebalance strategy, its taking sides on disputes in the South China Sea, and 
its direct intervention that have escalated the tensions and made the issue more 
complicated.”109   
From the Chinese perspective, peaceful adherence to a status quo in the South 
China Sea began to breakdown in roughly 2009, partly driven by the U.S. rebalance to 
Asia.  Michael Swaine writes that “many characterize what Westerners regard as 
potentially dangerous efforts to confront and challenge the U.S. and Western norms as a 
less threatening but totally justified response to Western (and especially U.S.) 
provocations.”110  According to the Zhang Haiwen, “since [the] 1970s, the situation of 
the South China Sea was under the effective control of China and its neighboring 
countries” and was “peaceful and stable in the whole” until when “in about 2009, the 
United States adjusted its global strategy and enhanced its strategic deployment in [the] 
Asian-Pacific region.”111  According to Chu Shulong, “since the U.S. ‘pivot’ to Asia, 
more troubles have been taking place in the region and tensions among Asians have risen 
higher, not lower.”112  Xu Bu asserts that “since 2009, some US senior officials have 
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repeatedly made irresponsible remarks about China's policy, rendered support to the 
countries having disputes with China, and gone even further to drive wedges between 
China and South-east Asian countries.”113 
  Wu writes that “in view of ‘at risk’ American national interest in the SCS, the 
Obama administration has adjusted its pivot towards the region, engaged 
comprehensively in regional affairs since 2009, and become a new key player that 
complicates the situation.”114  Yun Sun writes that “policy analysts in China 
overwhelmingly blame the United States for the rising tension in the South China Sea. In 
their views, the United States exploited the South China Sea issue to alienate China’s 
friendship with neighboring countries, strengthen America’s military alliance with the 
Philippines, and develop a strategic partnership with Vietnam so as to contain China’s 
growing influence and maintain U.S. superpower status in the region.”115 
Zhang pits blame for the escalation of the South China Sea conflict on the United 
States, stating that “taking the rapidly-developing China as its potential strategic rival, the 
United States turned its strategic focus to the Asian-Pacific region, [and] intervened [in] 
the South China Sea disputes by taking advantage of this occasion and implemented the 
containment strategy toward China.”116  According to Zhang, the South China Sea issue 
was “calmly controlled” by the various rival claimants until the United States decided to 
intervene in the dispute, emboldening some of the other claimants to attempt to “jointly 
counterbalance China.”117  Wu further asserts that “the US ‘rebalance’ strategy has 
turned Southeast Asia into a competition ground for major powers.” 118 
Wu asserts that a change in US policy that began in “2009 can be seen as a 
turning point” in the South China Sea dispute and U.S. involvement.119  Chinese sources 
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point to 2010, when U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced a U.S. return to 
the Asia Pacific region and subsequently brought up the South China Sea dispute as “a 
topic in the several ASEAN Regional Forum Foreign Ministers’ Meetings,” leading to 
the South China Sea dispute becoming a “‘hot spot’ for international media to 
speculate.”120  Wu also points to July 2009, when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
“signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation at the Sixteenth ASEAN Regional Forum.  
This event is often seen as a starting point for later actions by the Obama administration 
indicating a US strategic pivot shift towards the Asia-Pacific.”121   
 Wu Shicun asserts that “the United States has also strengthened its alliance with 
the Philippines and military cooperation with Vietnam; this indicates that the United 
States aims at fencing China for its own strategic purposes, and has shifted away from its 
previous commitment to stay neutral and not take sides in the South China Sea 
dispute…further complicating the disputes and regional situation.”122  Wu also singles 
out U.S. Secretary of State Clinton’s speech on November 16, 2011 “at the sixtieth 
anniversary of the Philippine–US Mutual Defense Treaty held on the USS FITZGERALD 
docked in Manila Bay, reaffirming the strong military relationships between the two 
countries and reiterating the great US concern about peaceful resolution of the SCS 
dispute,” “her presence on board a US warship, and use of ‘West Philippine Sea’ instead 
of SCS” as being “interpreted as US support of the Philippines against China in the SCS 
issue.”123 
Zhang accuses the United States of deliberately enhancing its relationship with 
Vietnam and the Philippines in order to “make them willingly play the roles of ‘agents’ to 
challenge and openly oppose China in the South China Sea.”124  Zhang asserts that the 
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United States, “by means of incitation, instigation, and cover support, encourages 
Vietnam and the Philippines to continuously provoke and oppose China.”125  
2. Assessment of Evidence 
The evidence in support of China’s claim that its aggressive behaviors since 
roughly 2009 have been in reaction to the actions of its regional rivals and the United 
States is both compelling and strong, specifically in cases such as with the 2009 
submission of claims to the United Nation wherein China can clearly point to specific 
actions taken by claimants that were followed by actions of China.  When China has 
decided to react, however, it has not acted to simply restore the status quo in the South 
China Sea disrupted by the provocations of others, but rather to create a new one that is 
more favorable to China.  China often acts disproportionally to the actions of its rivals, 
such as in the previously covered incidents at sea section wherein those incidents China 
responded with significantly greater shows of force and numbers.  In the Spratlys, this 
can be seen in the extent of its reclamation, which has far exceeded that of its rivals.  This 
has only heightened perceptions of Chinese assertiveness and a belief, while 
misconstrued and oversimplified, that China is solely responsible for the heightened 
tensions and proclaimed regional crisis.   
B. APPLICATION TO RECLAMATION IN SPRATLYS 
In 2013, China commenced large-scale land reclamation and outpost expansion 
projects at all seven of it occupied territories within the Spratlys.  The Chinese narrative 
is that, in the case of Spratly reclamation, China is the victim and is acting to address the 
deteriorating regional status quo by bolstering its position, allowing China to catch up to 
is rivals and better defend is territorial claims.  Fu Ying and Wu Shicun, addressing 
China’s decision to commence Spratlys reclamation, state that “in view of the changing 
situation in the South China Sea, and to meet the civil and defense needs on the islands 
and to defend its sovereignty, China launched reclamation projects on its controlled 
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Nansha islands.”126  Chinese officials and scholars also attribute this activity to China 
“playing catch-up to rival claimants, who are portrayed as having engaged in decades of 
construction and land reclamation work on features in the sea, as well as exploitation of 
economic resources, including oil.”127   
The official Chinese narrative is that the Spratly’s are historically and 
indisputably the sole property of China, and the very presence of foreign outposts on the 
Spratly features by China’s rivals undermine China’s claims.  Furthermore, any actions 
by China’s rival claimants to upgrade existing facilities in the territories within the 
Spratlys which they control are seen by China to upset the status quo.  In March 2015, a 
spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responding to questions about the 
intentions behind China’s reclamation activities in the Spratlys stated that “China is 
carrying out necessary construction on its own islands and reefs. The construction does 
not target or affect anyone. We are not like some countries, who engage in illegal 
construction in another person’s house. And we do not accept criticism from others when 
we are merely building facilities in our own yard. We have every right to do things that 
are lawful and justified.”128  From the Chinese perspective, China’s reclamation activities 
are a result of provocative actions taken by China’s rival claimants and, as the Spratlys 
are the sole property of China, China’s reclamation activities are beyond reproach.   
Chinese officials and scholars attribute China’s land reclamation projects in the 
Spratlys as being in response to both a general upsetting of the status quo in the South 
China Sea and provocative actions by China’s rivals and the United States that have 
compelled China to act to better defend its maritime and territorial claims.  These 
provocative actions include all the areas of grievance addressed in the preceding section 
that Chinese officials and scholars attribute to escalation into a regional crisis.  From this 
perspective, China’s actions, if they are indeed reactive and not independently deliberate, 
are more of a reaction to a perceive trend away from the status quo that now favors 
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China’s rivals, thus forcing China’s to react, as opposed to being due to a specific 
catalytic event that would make China’s decision to commence reclamation more easily 
attributable. 
Admiral Sun Jianguo of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy commented in 
his official remarks at the 2016 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue that “the present intensification 
of the South China Sea issue is due to individual countries deliberately causing 
provocation for their own interests.”129  Additionally, he also commented that “we don’t 
cause trouble, and we are not afraid of getting into trouble. China cannot swallow painful 
consequences, evil consequences; it cannot permit its sovereignty and security rights and 
interests to be encroached upon; it cannot sit idly and watch a minority of countries stir 
up trouble in the South China Sea.”130  From this perspective, China’s reactive actions 
have been defensive in nature.   
Chinese scholars Fu Ying and Wu Shicun argue that, “from the Chinese 
perspective … the US's dramatically altered policy on the South China Sea has 
heightened China’s fears that its interests would be further undermined, thus inspiring its 
determination and measures to defend them.”131  These defensive measures include 
China’s reclamation and outpost construction projects which will enhance China’s ability 
to respond to any future provocative actions which China may see as attempts to upset 
regional stability and the status quo.  Furthermore, Fu and Wu also argue that “the US has 
accelerated provocative and coercive actions that are clearly targeted at China.”132 As 
evidence, Fu and Wu assert that “the number of sorties flown by the US planes to 
conduct close-in reconnaissance at the South China Sea Islands has increased from about 
260 in 2009 to over 1,200 in 2014.”133 
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To support China’s claim of its reclamation as being responsive, Chinese officials 
and scholars also claim that China’s reclamation efforts are in direct response to similar 
such reclamation activities that have been undertaken by rival Spratly Island claimants, 
asserting that “other claimants, including Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Taiwan, 
have also reclaimed land and fortified features in the area, that…Vietnam, occupies 
considerably more features in the Spratlys than China does, and that others have 
constructed airstrips and based troops on features they control.”134  Ian Storey writes that 
“Beijing has argued that it is playing catch up with other claimants; as the Philippines 
undertook reclamation activities in the 1970s, Malaysia in the 1980s, Taiwan on Itu Aba 
in 2014 and Vietnam over the past two years, China has accused critics of hypocrisy and 
applying double standards.”135  According to Ma Shikun, a senior commentator at the 
People’s Daily:  
China is just catching up with longstanding efforts by others to build out 
South China Sea islands and reefs.  For two years, the Philippines has 
been engaged in land reclamation and build-out on islands and reefs taken 
from China.  For five years, Vietnam has been engaged in massive 
construction activities—including building harbor basins, runways, 
barracks, missile positions and helipads—on more than 20 islands and 
reefs seized from China.136   
China Greg Austin writes that “in the past 20 years…China has not physically 
occupied additional features.  By contrast, Vietnam has doubled its holdings, and much of 
that activity has occurred recently, [and] the Vietnamese occupations appear to have 
increased from 30 to 48 in the last six years.”137  According to David Shear, the U.S. 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, in his statement 
before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in May 2015, “between 2009 and 
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2014, Vietnam was the most active claimant in terms of both outpost upgrades and land 
reclamation, reclaiming approximately 60 acres, [and] all territorial claimants, with the 
exception of China and Brunei, have also already built airstrips of varying sizes and 
functionality on disputed features in the Spratlys.”138   
While the evidence of occupation and number of outposts is separate from the 
evidence of reclamation, it supports China’s grievance of having a weaker position in the 
Spratlys.  Shear stated that, “in the Spratly Islands, Vietnam has 48 outposts; the 
Philippines, 8; China, 8; Malaysia, 5; and Taiwan, 1.”139  Additionally, Shear stated that 
all of China’s rival claimants in the Spratlys “have also engaged in construction activity 
of differing scope and degree."140  Addressing China’s airfield construction in the 
Spratlys, Dolven et al. write that “even before China’s recent reported construction of an 
airstrip on Fiery Cross Reef, four other claimants had already built airfields big enough 
for large fighter planes on features they control in the Spratly Islands.”141  Furthermore, 
Vietnam reportedly has “carried out large-scale reclamation on over 20 maritime 
features’ in the Spratly Islands and ‘built on them a considerable amount of fixed 
facilities such as harbor basins, airstrip, missile bases, office buildings, barracks, hotels 
and lighthouses.”142  AMTI analysis of Vietnam’s reclamation activities in the Spratlys 
revealed that “Vietnam has created just over 120 acres of new land in the South China 
Sea, mostly at Spratly Island, Southwest Cay, Sin Cowe Island, and West Reef, [and] the 
majority of this work has occurred in the last two years. By comparison, China has 
created almost 3,000 acres of new land at the seven features it occupies in the Spratly 
Islands.”143 All this data leads credence to China’s claims that it is not the only country 
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with military outposts in the Spratlys, nor is it the only claimant to have conducted 
reclamation and outpost expansion. 
The biggest problem with China’s addressed occupation and reclamation 
grievances against its rival claimants being used to support the decision for China to 
conduct its own reclamation is that these activities by China’s rivals have been ongoing 
for several decades and occurred amidst the period of stable relations that China argues 
has been disrupted by its rivals.  Therefore, China’s grievances with the actions of its 
rivals predate the shift toward increased regional tensions beginning in roughly 2009.  If 
China indeed decided to conduct reclamation as a reaction to the actions of others, it 
appears to be a decision based in fear that they are losing in the balance of power conflict 
in the South China Sea. 
C. CONCLUSION 
It is not easy to differentiate between the instigator and the respondent in an 
ongoing crisis such as the Spratly crisis.  All relevant parties share the blame in the 
escalation of the crisis.  This chapter, however, sought to shed light on the evidence 
behind China’s claims that it is reacting to others when it is conducting its proclaimed 
assertive actions.   
It does appear that prior to the U.S. rebalance to the Pacific, the Spratly Island 
dispute was better managed amongst the claimants.  Additionally, actions by rival 
claimants, largely by Vietnam and the Philippines, seem to have driven much of China’s 
behavior which has been deemed to have been assertive in the years since 2009.  While 
China’s actions have often had the effect of projecting China’s relative dominance onto 
its neighbors, it is often provoked into acting.  China, in disproportionately responding to 
the crises as they occur, seemingly is attempting to stave off further perceived acts that 
threaten China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea and within the Spratlys.   
This has continued into the Spratlys where China, feeling that its maritime claims 
are under threat, has conducted reclamation activities of its own in order to counteract the 
actions of others and establish primacy for its own claims over the disputed territories and 
waters in the South China Sea.  However, in the Spratlys, the evidence to support a 
 49 
Chinese reactive approach are weaker in that there is no clear catalyst which prompted 
Chinese actions that has occurred since the shift toward increased regional tensions in 
2009.  Instead China has pointed to the actions of its rivals over a series of years in which 
it had not, until 2013, sought to respond to in kind.  To me, this seemingly suggests that 
Chinese officials, with a well-founded and evidenced grievance against its rivals that had 
for years been conducting activities in violation of the 2002 DOC, decided to 
significantly improve China’s position in the Spratlys through a massive land reclamation 
and outpost expansion program.  Separate from merely reacting, China’s sought to better 
its position rather than simply responding to a specific catalytic event.  It was more of a 
response to the greater South China Sea crisis and a need by Chinese officials that 
China’s stake in the region was strengthened, bettering China’s position to address the 
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IV. POWER PROJECTION ENHANCEMENT AS THE DRIVER 
BEHIND CHINESE SPRATLY RECLAMATION 
China’s actions in the South China Sea overall, and more specifically within the 
Spratlys, were driven by a desire to increase its ability to project military power within 
the South China Sea. The desired effect is that China will better be able to defend its 
southern maritime approaches and contested territorial claims, while simultaneously 
having a wider array of options available for responding to external challenges in the 
South China Sea.   
From a strategic perspective, China arguably needed to continue expansion into 
the South China Sea—including its Spratly reclamation and outpost expansion projects—
in order to further expand its relative military advantage over the other claimants and 
support China’s greater regional ambitions.  Peter Jennings, the executive director of the 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, asserts that China’s “efforts in the region reflect a 
broader set of strategic priorities: to strengthen maritime force projection capability; to 
raise the level of difficulty and cost to any opposing military force operating in the 
region; and to broaden options open to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in any future 
contingency.”144  According to Ian Storey, a senior fellow at the Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies in Singapore, “the gap that existed two decades ago between the military 
power of the People’s Republic of China and the countries of Southeast Asia has widened 
into a chasm.”145   
This chapter examines the second explanation for China’s land reclamation and 
outpost expansion project at its controlled territories in the South China Sea contested 
Spratlys: the new outposts on these reclaimed islands were deliberately created to 
enhance China’s capability to project military power in the South China Sea and beyond, 
the primary driver behind its actions.  First, I will examine the supporting evidence 
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behind China’s general desire to increase its power projection capabilities in the South 
China Sea.  Secondly, I will examine China’s actions in the broader South China Sea 
through the lens of power projection as the driver behind Chinese actions.  Thirdly, I will 
examine the enhancements these expanded outposts and reclaimed islands will provide to 
China’s capability to project military power further from the mainland: increased 
offensive military capabilities in the South China Sea; enhanced intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; and enhanced logistics support and forward 
basing for military assets.  This does not mean to suggest that China will use these 
enhanced capabilities, as they bolster both offensive and defensive military options.  It is 
certain, however, that these outposts will further increase China’s military capabilities in 
the South China Sea relative to its neighbors. 
A. CHINA’S GOAL: INCREASE CAPABILITY TO PROJECT POWER IN 
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
China recognizes the importance of the South China Sea and the importance of 
protecting its interests there.  Alan Dupont, a nonresident fellow at the Lowy Institute for 
International Policy highlights the South China Sea’s importance, stating that “the South 
China Sea carries more than 40 percent of world trade and 50 percent of energy trade, 
with the gateway Malacca Strait having overtaken the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal, and 
the Straits of Hormuz as the world’s most critical waterway.”146  Oriana Skylar Mastro, 
an assistant professor of security studies at Georgetown University writes that “the 
burgeoning need to protect commercial assets and Chinese nationals abroad will lead the 
country to develop some global power-projection capabilities.”147  Taking her argument 
one step further, the economic importance of the South China Sea has, in part, driven 
China to increase its capability to project power there. 
In 2013, China issued a defense white paper that showcased the growing 
importance China placed on the maritime domain, stating that:  
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China is a major maritime as well as land country.  The seas and oceans 
provide immense space and abundant resources for China’s sustainable 
development, and thus are of vital importance to the people’s wellbeing 
and China’s future.  It is an essential national development strategy to 
exploit, utilize, and protect the seas and oceans, and build China into a 
maritime power.  It is an important duty for the PLA to resolutely 
safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests.148 
John Mearsheimer, arguing on behalf of the rationale for China’s shift toward 
focusing on bolstering its capabilities to project power within the South China Sea, 
argues that “for understandable reasons, they want to be able to protect their sea lanes and 
not have to depend on the American navy to handle that mission for them.”149   
To support China’s capabilities to protect its interests in this vital area, in China’s 
2015 Defense White paper, the Chinese Navy was tasked to “gradually shift its focus 
from ‘offshore waters defense’ to the combination of ‘offshore waters defense’ with 
‘open seas protection.”150  The 2015 Defense White Paper proclaimed that China’s 
armed forces will “get ready to safeguard national sovereignty and security, protect the 
country’s maritime rights and interests, and deal with armed conflicts and 
emergencies.”151  The White Paper also stated that it is a “long-standing task for China to 
safeguard its maritime rights and interests.”152  Furthermore, in addressing a need the 
White Paper highlighted the need for the PLA to increase its capabilities to project 
power, stating that “with the growth of China's national interests, its national security is 
more vulnerable to international and regional turmoil, terrorism, piracy, serious natural 
disasters and epidemics, and the security of overseas interests concerning energy and 
resources, strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCs), as well as institutions, 
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personnel and assets abroad, has become an imminent issue.”153 These excerpts, taken 
together, reflect a general emphasis placed on enhancing China’s capability to project 
military power further from the Chinese coast, to provide enhanced protection for 
China’s national interests in the region and further abroad. 
China is shifting from a more defensive military power to one that its more 
capable of power projection into areas of vital interest away from the Chinese mainland, 
such as the South China Sea.  Ian Storey writes that “China’s leaders have determined to 
transform the country into a global maritime power, and to that end the People’s 
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is emerging as Asia’s largest and most capable navy.”154 
Similarly, the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense argued in its 2015 China Military 
Power Report that, “as China’s global footprint and international interests grow, its 
military modernization program has become more focused on investments and 
infrastructure to support a range of missions beyond China’s periphery, including power 
projection.”155   
This is all, according to one expert, part of “China’s long-term strategy to 
strengthen its position.”156  Despite attempts by other regional powers to bolster their 
own capabilities, China has emerged as the dominant regional power.  Ian Storey writes 
that “while Southeast Asian countries have ramped up their defense budgets over the past 
few years, and acquired new, larger, and more lethal assets, their navies, and especially 
their coast guards, are dwarfed by China’s; neither individually nor collectively can the 
countries of Southeast Asia match China’s growing military power.”157 
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B. BROADER APPLICATION TO PAST SOUTH CHINA SEA BEHAVIOR 
China has been building up a robust military capability that predates the 
devolution of the South China Sea territorial dispute into a broader regional crisis.  
China’s military growth has quickly accelerated with the growth of the Chinese economy.  
Renato Cruz de Castro, a professor at De La Salle University in Manila, wrote in 2015 
that “China has had an annual double-digit increase in defense spending since 2006.”158  
Furthermore, Cruz de Castro contends that “China’s aggressive pursuit of claims in the 
South China Sea has increased in tandem with the expansion of its navy and maritime 
services.”159  Chu Shulong, a professor at Tsinghua University in China, acknowledges 
China’s growing military capabilities in the region and writes that “China will keep 
rising…[and] the rise of China does include its growing military strength and activities in 
the western Pacific, including in the South China Sea.”160 
The internationalization and widening of China’s maritime disputes with its 
rivals, beginning in roughly 2009, also led to a realization that China needed to further 
enhance its military capabilities to better enable China’s military force to respond to 
increasingly more frequent crisis situations in the South China Sea that, from a Chinese 
perspective, threaten its security and regional interests.  Cruz de Castro contends that 
“China views the consolidation of its claim over the South China Sea as contributing to it 
territorial integrity and national security.”161  Furthermore, Cruz de Castro argues that 
Chinese officials believe that by having a “strong People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 
China can boldly advance its ‘core interests’ in the maritime domain.”162  Cruz de Castro 
views the Chinese desire to project military power in the region as driving “China’s 
insistence on an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, the conduct 
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of live-fire exercise by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the People’s 
Liberation Air Force in the Western Pacific, and the lard-line response of the PLAN and 
other maritime law enforcement agencies during several confrontations with Philippine 
and Vietnamese civilian ships in the South China Sea.”163   
China’s Navy has been increasing its presence in the South China Sea and further 
from the Chinese mainland coast, reflective of China’s ambition to project greater 
military power in the South China Sea and region.  Phillip Saunders, Director of the 
Center for Study of Chinese Military Affairs, argues that “the PLA navy has used 
exercises and extended deployments to demonstrate its improved capability to defend 
Chinese maritime claims in the South China Sea.”164  To back up this argument, 
Saunders references the “March 2013 deployment of a four-ship PLA navy flotilla into 
the South China Sea, … the Liaoning’s [China’s sole aircraft carrier] initial training 
deployment in November 2013 … into the South China Sea, [and] … a January 2014 
PLA navy deployment of two Chinese destroyers and one amphibious landing craft in the 
South China Sea, including through the Paracel Islands and past James Shoal.”165 
The desire to project greater military power within the region by Chinese military 
and civilian leaders has also led to China’s military forces selectively engaging in 
disputes with its rivals.  One example was during the mid-2012 Scarborough Shoal 
incident between China and the Philippines wherein China “insisted on its authority and 
control over the contested territory and its related resources and rights.  A few days after 
Chinese and Filipino civilian vessels withdrew from the contested shoal, thus ending the 
impasse, China deployed military and paramilitary forces in the South China Sea.”166 
From this perspective, China used the Scarborough Shoal incident as an opportunity to 
assert great dominance within the South China Sea and set the stage for further projection 
of military power and maritime expansion within the region.  Patrick Cronin argues that 
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“China has exploited moves by neighbors in order to justify greater Chinese 
assertiveness.”167 
C. MILITARY APPLICATION OF SPRATLY RECLAMATION 
China’s extensive land reclamation and outpost expansion projects within the 
Spratlys were conducted primarily to enhance its military capabilities in the region and 
further China’s ability to assert greater control over the South China Sea.  Ben Dolven et 
al. assert that, “for China, the operational value of building islands in the Spratlys would 
derive from the islands’ location in the east-central part of the South China Sea, several 
hundred miles south of China’s mainland, and from the facilities that China would place 
on them.”168  According to Storey, “the ongoing reclamation projects in the Spratly 
Islands will enable China to project decisive power into the very heart of maritime 
Southeast Asia with the ultimate goal of achieving dominance within the so-called nine-
dash line.”169  Storey also asserts that this enhanced power projection capabilities will 
“assist the PLA in two of its core missions: first, defending the country’s maritime trade 
routes that pass through the South China Sea; and second, forward-deployed PLA-Navy 
ships and aircraft could be used as part of what the United States calls China’s anti-
access/area denial strategy to deter or defeat third-party (i.e. American) intervention in 
military contingencies in the Taiwan Straits or Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.”170  From this 
perspective, land reclamation in the Spratlys was just the next step that would allow 
China to continue improving its position in the region by bolstering its capabilities to 
project military power further from the Chinese mainland.  Jennings, commenting on the 
purpose of the expanded outposts upon the reclaimed islands argues that “the most 
obvious strategic utility of the island construction is simply to assert Chinese presence in 
peacetime.”171 
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China has avoided discussing, especially in detail, how these bases will 
specifically be used to support China’s military capabilities.  Dolven et al. write that “the 
Chinese government did not comment substantively on the work until March 2015 and 
did not offer any explanation of its intentions for use of the artificial islands it was 
building until April 2015.”172  Beginning in 2015, however, China began to linking the 
bases to military capabilities in official statements.  In April 2015, China Foreign 
Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying stated that the new facilities would be used for 
“better safeguarding territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests…[and] after 
the construction, the islands and reefs will be able to provide all-round and 
comprehensive services to meet various civilian demands besides satisfying the need of 
necessary military defense.”173  Similarly, PLA Admiral Sun Jianguo stated at the 2015 
IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore that the expanded outposts and reclaimed islands 
would, in part, serve the purpose of meeting the “necessary defense needs” of 
the PLA.174 
While China has publicly confirmed that the new outposts will support military 
objectives in addition to civilian ones, Chinese officials have not expounded on 
specifically on how the outposts will perform military functions.  One reason for this is a 
general lack of transparency about China’s military capabilities.  Patrick Cronin, senior 
director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, 
makes the claim that “Chinese leaders often see transparency as undermining China’s 
authority and core interests.”175  Similarly, Phillip Saunders writes that “China has 
historically been reluctant to reveal its military capabilities, with Chinese officers arguing 
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that transparency benefits the strong (who reveal their capabilities) at the expense of the 
weak (who reveal their vulnerabilities).”176   
An additional reason is that by downplaying the military uses for the bases and 
highlighting the civilian purposes, China is effectively attempting to portray the projects 
as less threatening to the other Spratly claimants.  Storey comments on China’s 
proclaimed uses for the island outposts, stating that “despite China’s attempt to put a 
civilian gloss on the reclamations, they are overwhelmingly strategic in purpose.”177  
While it is near impossible to measure the success of such a strategy, the effect would be 
a lessened international or regional response to China’s reclamation activities than has 
occurred.  A lack of Chinese official statements does not necessarily weaken this 
argument, however, because if China did indeed conduct these reclamation projects for 
primarily defensive purposes, I would expect China to not confirm the military nature of 
the outposts.  China’s relative lack of willingness to discuss the military nature of these 
reclaimed islands and expanded outposts serves as potential evidence to support such an 
explanation. 
Bonnie Glaser, a senior advisor for Asia in the Freeman Chair in China Studies at 
CSIS, asserts that “much of the concern [about the Chinese reclamation] is due to fear 
about the purposes for which China will use the new islands infrastructure.”178  When 
construction is finished, the Chinese outposts being constructed upon the reclaimed, 
artificial islands in the Spratlys “will include harbors, communications and surveillance 
systems, logistics facilities, and three airfields.”179   
A look at what has been constructed and/or what is currently under construction, 
reveals that the bases will support China’s capability to project military power in the 
South China Sea in three interrelated ways, which will be covered more in depth in the 
sections that follow: increased offensive military capabilities in the South China Sea, 
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increasing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities (ISR), and logistics 
support and forward basing for military assets. China needs to increase the number and 
types of military assets deployed to the South China Sea if it wants to project enhanced 
military power in that region.  A robust ISR capability will allow China to better monitor 
the force movements of its rivals and to best know where to project force when China 
feels the need to do so.  Finally, an improved logistics capability and chain is necessary to 
support military operations in both peacetime and wartime by increasing the sustainment 
of military assets deployed away from the Chinese mainland.  The functions these 
reclaimed islands and expanded outposts will perform sheds light on the true intention 
behind the projects—the desire to increase China’s power projection capabilities in the 
South China Sea. 
1. Increased Offensive Capabilities 
The first overarching way in which the outposts will enhance China’s capability 
to project military power in the South China Sea is to increase China’s offensive military 
capabilities further from the Chinese mainland coast.  Specifically looking at the 
advantages these outposts will provide within the South China Sea region, Raine and Le 
Miere argue that “control, if not sovereignty, over the Spratlys enables the monitoring of 
traffic through the sea, including the use of some intelligence-gathering capabilities, and 
the theoretical housing of anti-ship missiles that could threaten larger vessels transiting 
through the area; … this strategic importance is reflected in the fact that the South China 
Sea potentially offers one of the few sanctuaries for China’s naval assets against attack, 
while also promising the access to the open seas required by larger vessels and 
submarines through the Luzon Strait.”180 
In a 2015 U.S. Congressional Research Service report on China’s Spratly 
reclamation, authors Ben Dolven et al. assert that “China could use one or more of the 
reclamation sites as locations for anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems, including 
radars, electronic listening equipment, surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, 
and manned and unmanned aircraft in addition [to] small numbers of Chinese navy ships 
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[which] might be stationed at one or more of the sites, perhaps on a rotation basis.”181  
The motivation behind “stationing A2/AD systems such as air defense, ACMs, tactical 
aircraft, and antisubmarine warfare aircraft at bases in the Spratlys” is to “project 
elements of China’s A2/AD network further into the South China Sea, and thicken the 
overall density of the network.”182 
These outposts, and greater control of the South China Sea will also be 
advantageous to China’s submarines, an integral component of China’s military power 
projection capabilities.  Glaser writes “the island build-up could be an attempt to establish 
a defensive perimeter protecting an underground base for nuclear missile submarines at 
Yulin on the southern coast of Hainan Island, [and] the South China Sea’s deep sea floor 
with underwater canyons could also provide a sanctuary where Chinese submarines could 
avoid detection.”183  
One perspective on the benefits to China’s offensive military capabilities is that 
the outposts upon the newly reclaimed islands will increase China’s military capability to 
forcibly take control of rival claimant outposts and territories or force rivals to abandon 
their respective outposts.  Glaser writes that “helicopters, amphibious landing craft, and 
mobile artillery batteries could be used to conduct assaults on nearby land features.”184  
According to Dolven et al. “basing smaller numbers of Chinese troops on one or more of 
these islands … could give China a limited amphibious assault capability: with the use of 
helicopters and amphibious landing craft, and support from Chinese mobile artillery 
stationed on the outposts, such troops could be used for conducting assaults on nearby 
islands held by rival claimants.”185 China could also use these capabilities to force 
adversaries to abandon their outposts.  Glaser writes that “China could opt to put pressure 
on rival claimants to abandon some of their outposts.”186  Similarly, Storey asserts that 
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“PLAN and coast guard assets may also be used to increase pressure on the other 
claimants to vacate the atolls under their control.”187 
An additional perspective is that China’s outposts being constructed on its newly 
reclaimed ‘islands’ are “the first step to prepare the infrastructure for the establishment of 
an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea; the reclaimed 
features could be the base for an airport and would extend the reach of the Chinese air 
force to the south of the South China Sea.”188  According to Glaser, “in November 2013, 
China unilaterally set up an ADIZ in disputed waters in the East China, [and], at the same 
time, a PLA major general confided that the Chinese military has long had plans to 
establish an ADIZ in China’s near seas, including the East China Sea, Yellow Sea, and 
South China Sea.”189  Similarly, Storey asserts that “enhanced surveillance capabilities 
and the presence of combat aircraft raises the prospect that Beijing will establish an Air 
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the South China Sea as it controversially did in 
the East China Sea in 2013.”190  
Whether China will decide to establish an ADIZ over the South China Sea will 
ultimately be a political decision as much as it is a military one and there are currently no 
indications that China has definitely decided one way or another in this regard; however, 
these outposts would increase China’s capabilities in this regard.  Looking at the evidence 
behind the ADIZ assertion, Glaser writes that “an airstrip more than 10,000 feet long has 
been built on Fiery Cross Reef, which is big enough for virtually all of China’s aircraft, 
including fighter jets, transport planes, airborne early warning and control, and 
surveillance and tanker aircraft.”191  Continuing, Glaser writes that “these runways, along 
with radar and refueling facilities to support operations by intercept aircraft, could 
increase China’s capability to monitor and patrol an ADIZ.”192  Dolven et al. write that 
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“should China at some point declare an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the 
South China Sea, radars stationed at one or more of these sites, and the use of the runway 
and refueling facilities at Fiery Cross Reef to support operations by intercept aircraft, 
could enhance the enforcement of that ADIZ.”193 
Yet another perspective is that the increased offensive capabilities in the Spratlys 
and southern South China Sea will “provide China with capability to hold U.S. forces at 
risk at a farther distance than it can at present, [and] this could have implications for a 
U.S. effort to come to Taiwan’s defense.  A U.S. carrier battle group sailing from the 
Arabian Gulf or Indian Ocean to come [to] Taiwan’s aid would have to pass through the 
South China Sea.”194  Glaser continues, writing on how these Spratly outposts would 
delay U.S. wartime intervention in a scenario pitting China and the United States at odds 
with one another, writing that “in wartime, the need to attack these sites and the aircraft 
and ships deploying from them would divert U.S. assets from performing other 
missions.”195  
2. Increased Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Capabilities 
To enhance China’s ability to project power, it needs to develop a robust ISR 
capability in the South China Sea.  Part of power projection is knowing where to project 
that power.  At an International Defense forum in China in 2014, a senior PLA Air Force 
officer stated that “there is a need for a base to support our radar system and intelligence-
gathering activities,” and “there is a need for a base of operations in the South China Sea 
for state security and to protect national interest.”196  Glaser asserts that “China’s 
outposts in the Spratlys will undoubtedly be equipped with radar and electronic listening 
equipment that will enhance China’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and 
maritime domain awareness capabilities in the South China Sea.” 197 
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Additional ISR capabilities in the Spratlys will significantly improve China’s 
capabilities to monitor to movements of air and sea traffic through the South China Sea.  
According to Glaser, “depending on what platforms and systems are deployed on these 
outposts, China could have the ability to monitor most, if not all, of the South China Sea 
on a 24/7 basis, [and] these enhanced capabilities will provide China advantages over its 
weaker neighbors and pose challenges to U.S. military activities in the region.”198  Storey 
writes that “radar, surveillance, and communication systems, together with the presence 
of fighter jets operating from airfield on Fiery Cross and Subi Reefs, will also enable 
China to greatly enhance its maritime domain awareness in the South China Sea.”199  
Dolven et al. write that “improved MDA and ISR capabilities would support both day-to-
day activities and potential combat operations.”200  An increased ISR capability will 
greatly bolster China’s capabilities to project power in the South China Sea and would 
significantly aid China in the monitoring of the movements of its adversaries, including 
the United States, in the region. 
3. Increased Logistics Support and Sustainment 
The third and final overarching benefit that the outposts will provide to China’s 
power projection capabilities is to increase the logistics support for and sustainment of 
Chinese military and paramilitary assets operating in the Spratlys and in the southern 
South China Sea.  Dolven et al. assert that “China’s land reclamation efforts in the South 
China Sea could improve China’s ability to maintain ship and aircraft operations in the 
region on a day-to-day basis,” and that “enhanced military facilities in the Spratlys could 
mitigate the logistical challenges of sustaining operations of navy ships, coast guard 
cutters, and fishing boats in the southern South China Sea, far from Hainan Island and 
China’s mainland coast.”201  Commenting on the logistics benefits provided by airfields 
China is currently constructing in the Spratlys, Glaser asserts that “one or more runways 
in the Spratlys will support refueling operations for aircraft based on the mainland and 
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Hainan Island, extending their operational ranges to encompass the entire South China 
Sea and beyond.”202 
Once the outposts are completed, China could decide to forward deploy military 
assets at the artificial island outposts.  Dolven et al. write that “small numbers of boats, 
cutters, and ships might be stationed at one or more of the reclamation sites, perhaps on a 
rotational basis.”203  Storey, similarly commenting on the potential for naval forward 
deployments, writes that “the harbors and other facilities under construction will enable 
the PLAN and coast guard to maintain a permanent presence in and around the Spratlys, 
without the need to return to mainland ports for reprovisioning, maintenance, and crew 
rotation.”204   
The forward deployment of military assets at China’s Spratly outposts could be 
both permanent or rotational, increasing the number of Chinese military ships and 
equipment in the Spratlys and the southern South China Sea, which would “widen the 
range of capabilities available to China, and reduce the time required to deploy them.”205  
Dolven et al. comment that the outposts “could permit China to maintain a more frequent, 
denser, and operationally effective presence of fishing boats, coast guard ships, and navy 
ships in the region, improving China’s ability to use these waters for its own purposes 
and to enforce its territorial claims over these waters.”206  Storey, commenting on the 
benefit forward basing will have on China’s power projection capabilities, writes that the 
“forward deployed PLAN and coast guard vessels can be used to enforce Beijing’s 
sovereignty and sovereign rights claims in the South China Sea, and to provide protection 
for Chinese fishing vessels and drilling platforms operating in the EEZs of other coastal 
states that are within China’s so-called nine-dash line.”207 
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In addition to increasing the number of military assets capable of being deployed 
to area, the stationing of these assets, whether permanently or rotationally, will have the 
effect of shortening China’s response to a wide array of potential crisis scenarios by 
significantly lessening distances to potential hotspots.  Glaser writes that “stepped-up 
maritime patrols from these newly built-up bases far from China’s shores…mean more 
government ships are on hand to intimidate other nation’s fishing fleets and to intervene 
when other nations’ government vessels attempt to arrest Chinese fishers.”208  Glaser 
further asserts that “the ability of Chinese government ships to come quickly to the aid of 
fishing boats in far-flung portions of the South China Sea is another advantage of remote 
island outposts capable of hosting and refueling government fleets.”209  Glaser also 
argues that “an enhanced Chinese presence at the eastern and southern edges of the South 
China Sea would allow for more frequent and larger-scale disruption to energy 
exploration and drilling operations conducted by claimants…[and] more capability to 
interfere with such operations…and defend its own oil rigs, which are increasingly being 
used to assert sovereignty in the waters of the South China Sea.”210 
D. CONCLUSION 
An examination of both official Chinese statements and observations on what 
China has constructed upon its newly reclaimed islands reveals the motivations behind 
China’s desire to conduct these activities, as well as the significant enhancement to 
China’s military power projection capabilities that these new outposts will provide.  
Rather than being driven by a specific catalytic event that triggered China’s decision, the 
projects are best seen as a continuation of more than a decade of defense spending and 
the general bolstering of China’s military forces that are aimed at increasing China’s 
capability to project military power within the region and further abroad.  As China’s 
military and economic power have increased, its need to project such power has also 
increased as China’s interests have increasingly expanded worldwide, making protection 
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of important sea lines of communication choke points, such as the Strait of Malacca, 
increasingly prudent for such a rising power. 
The evidence for this explanation lies best in China’s actions.  These bases and 
reclaimed islands far surpass any similar such activities by China’s rivals, and despite 
arguments by senior Chinese officials to the contrary, appear to fit an ambition much 
greater than purely handling maritime disputes with China’s significantly weaker rivals. 
Additionally, these land reclamation and outpost expansion projects fit an overarching 
ambition to enhance China’s power projection capabilities that has fueled the explosive 
growth of China’s military capabilities that started well before the South China Sea 
maritime dispute became more of an international crisis. 
  
 68 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 69 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, I examined two competing explanations for why China in 2013 
commenced land reclamation and outpost expansion projects at its seven controlled 
territories in the Spratlys.  The first, the reactive explanation, argues that China was 
driven by a need to react to the perceived provocative actions of its rival Spratly 
claimants and the United States in the South China Sea.  The second, the power 
projection enhancement explanation, argues that China’s decision was driven by an 
overarching desire to increase its power projection capabilities both within and outside 
the region.   
China’s decision to commence reclamation and outpost expansion in the South 
China Sea was driven by perceived needs to both react to its rivals and to bolster its 
power projection capabilities.  The reactionary argument explains the timing of China’s 
reclamation decision, serving as the proximate cause for this decision, as China since 
2009 had increasingly been assertively confronting its rivals in a series of incidents in the 
South China Sea.  The power projection explanation, however, best explains the overall 
drivers behind China’s reclamation and outpost expansion projects and serves as the 
ultimate cause for why China created these artificial islands and enhanced outposts.  The 
creation of these new outposts are an extension of military growth and enhancements to 
China’s military power projections capabilities that predate 2009 and which have 
mirrored China’s rise to great power status. 
In this final chapter, I will summarize my findings and present an argument that 
integrates these two explanations, and which helps explain China’s decision in late 2013 
to commence its massive land reclamation and outpost expansion project in the Spratlys, 




A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
In 2009, China’s behavior in the South China Sea is widely seen by scholars to 
have changed from being more inclined toward engagement toward an increased 
willingness to challenge its South China Sea rival claimants.  Then in 2013, China 
decided to conduct large-scale land reclamation and outpost expansion projects at each of 
its seven controlled territories in the Spratlys.  To understand China’s change in behavior 
with regard to the South China Sea and China’s land reclamation projects, I examined 
and evaluated two explanations: China was reacting to its rivals and the United States and 
that China was acting in order to increase its capability to project military power in the 
South China Sea region. 
In Chapter III, I examined the first explanation: China’s actions being driven by a 
need to react to the actions of others.  Chinese officials and scholars pointed to five 
categories of actions taken by China’s rival claimants and the United States which 
arguably supported China’s assertive, but reactionary responses.  The five categories of 
evidence were the following: the 2009 initial submission of maritime claims to the United 
Nations and the 2013 Philippine initiated arbitration case; national legislation, primarily 
by Vietnam and the Philippines which directly contested China’s territorial claims; 
maritime incidents between China and primarily Vietnam, the Philippines, and the United 
States which challenged China’s sovereignty over the South China Sea; a breakdown in 
regional dispute managements following the 2002 ASEAN DOC; and the involvement 
and interference by the United States which predated the 2011 U.S. announced rebalance 
to Asia. 
I also examined how this explanation applied to China’s decision to conduct its 
reclamation and outpost expansion projects in the Spratlys.  Chinese scholars and 
officials argued that China’s actions were driven by the following factors: a general 
upsetting of the status quo in the South China Sea; reclamation by China’s rivals that go 
back as far as the 1970s; and an occupation by China’s rivals of significantly more 
features in the Spratlys on which they had constructed their own outposts, including in all 
cases having built or assumed control of an airfield whereas China had none.  
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In Chapter IV, I examined the second explanation: China’s actions as driven by a 
desire to increase its capability to project military power both within and outside the 
region.  When addressing the overarching South China Sea dispute which became 
internationalized in 2009,  scholars point to the following evidence: a stated national goal 
to increase China’s ability to project power in the South China Sea in official documents 
and statements, such as China’s 2013 and 2015 Defense White Papers; markedly 
increased defense spending beginning in roughly 2006, and a gradual increasing Chinese 
military presence in the South China Sea region. 
I also examined China’s decision to conduct its land reclamation and outpost 
expansion projects from the lens of the power projection enhancement argument.  
Evidence to support this argument primarily consisted of official statements referencing 
the defense applications of the under-construction bases upon the artificial islands in the 
Spratlys and an analysis of what China had constructed and the impact that these outposts 
would have on China’s power projection capabilities.  Specifically, scholars pointed to 
the following effect that China’s new outposts would likely have on China’s ability to 
project military power in the South China Sea region: an increase in offensive capabilities 
which could support military operations in the region and further abroad, assist with any 
potentially declared Chinese ADIZ in the South China Sea, and help to combat the 
United States, or any other adversary, in the event of hostilities; and increase in China’s 
ISR capabilities in the South China Sea; and an increased logistics support and 
sustainment capability for Chinese navy, Coast Guard, and civilian fishing ships 
operating in the southern South China Sea.  The net result is that China’s capability to 
project military power will be significantly increased by the addition of these newly 
constructed outposts. 
My overall findings and arguments are presented in the following paragraphs.  
The reactive explanation best explains why, in 2013, China commenced these 
reclamation and outpost expansion projects from a timing and broader South China Sea 
dispute perspective.  China’s claims to the South China Sea and Spratlys were 
increasingly contested by its rivals.  In the diplomatic realm, China had, from its 
perspective, initially been challenged by its rivals via territorial submissions to the United 
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Nations in 2009.  China opposed these claims by its rivals and did its best contest them, 
but this did not deter the Philippines in 2013 from initiating its arbitration case against 
China over its South China Sea claims.  At sea, China confronted the Philippines at 
Scarborough Shoal in 2012 and it had won.  China may have been less capable of 
deterring its rivals in the diplomatic and legal realms, but, at sea, it had succeeded in 
countering its rivals with an unparalleled ability to amass ships—naval, Coast Guard, and 
fishing—in the southern South China Sea to defend its claims at even the slightest of 
perceived provocations.  The timing of China’s decision to commence its reclamation and 
outpost expansion projects, which will support a significantly increased Chinese presence 
in these contested South China Sea waters, fits that timeline. 
The reactive explanation, however, falls short in explaining China’s reclamation 
and outpost expansion projects in two ways.  First, some of China’s rival claimants had 
conducted reclamation many years earlier and there was a significant gap between their 
activities and China’s reaction.  Chinese officials reference land reclamation and outpost 
expansion projects by its rivals that both predate and followed the 2002 DOC.  From this 
perspective, China would have had the justification to act years before the South China 
Sea dispute became internationalized in 2009.  This does not explain the 2013 timing 
completely, unless one also factors in China’s growing military and economic strength.  
The reactionary argument thus presents only a proximate explanation for China’s actions.   
Second, even without the heightening of the dispute between China and its rivals, 
China was already on a trajectory toward an increasing military power projection 
capability and had expressed and demonstrated its intent to further develop additional 
such capabilities.  China’s increasing military growth and expansion of its power 
projection capabilities further from the Chinese mainland likely would have necessitated 
the eventual construction of such outposts.  China ultimately conducted its reclamation 
and outpost expansion projects because it could, and because these outposts would be 
necessary for the further expansion of China’s military power both within and outside the 
region.  These projects are a continuation of more than a decade of increases in defense 
spending and the general bolstering of China’s military power projection capabilities.  As 
China’s military and economic power have increased, its need to project such power has 
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also increased.  China’s interests have increasingly expanded worldwide, making 
protection of important sea lines of communication choke points, such as the Strait of 
Malacca, increasingly important for such an emerging global power and regional 
hegemon.   
Furthermore, the construction and reclamation projects likely would have been 
conducted in the absence of the perceived provocations by China’s rivals.  These outposts 
would not have been constructed without the growth of China’s military that predated 
2009 and which drove the construction of these outposts to further enhance China’s 
ability to project military power abroad.  In conclusion, both explanations explain 
China’s  decision to conduct its reclamation and outpost expansion projects in the 
Spratlys, but the reactionary argument best explains the timing for China’s actions while  
the power projection explanation ultimately best describes the overarching motivations 
behind China’s actions.  
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA’S FUTURE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
As far as China’s capabilities are concerned, capabilities do not imply intent and 
“any projection about future intent and capabilities is by its nature contingent and 
uncertain.”211  How China uses this enhanced capability will largely be dependent on the 
situation, the environment, and Chinese political will, and it is uncertain how and whether 
China will use the capabilities against its rivals in the future.  Simply having an increased 
capability to project power may be enough to aid Chinese leaders in achieving their 
ambitions for the country.  Additionally, what China forward-deploys to the outposts 
once completed, either on a rotational or permanent basis, will help to reveal how China 
will use the bases.  What is clear, however, is that if China did determine to use force 
against its rival Spratly claimants, these outposts would bolster China’s military offensive 
and defensive military capabilities.  It is also clear, from this research, that China places a 
significant amount of importance on the development of its military power projection 
capabilities. 
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Additionally, it is difficult to forecast how events in the South China Sea will 
unfold over the next several years as China’s newly expanded military outposts in the 
Spratlys are completed and China’s military footprint in the region increases.  The future 
of China and the dispute over overlapping territorial claims will largely depend on how 
China’s rivals respond to China’s increased military capability in the South China Sea as 
a result of the reclamation work.  The future of the dispute will also be determined by 
how China decides to use these outposts and whether it continues to aggressively react to 
perceived provocations by its rivals.  If China’s rival claimants continue to bolster their 
own capabilities and further challenge China in incidents at sea, China may decide to 
respond with force.  The amount of military force China could bring to bear in any 
dispute with its rivals will be significantly greater than the years prior to the construction 
of these expanded outposts, making it is increasingly unlikely China will lose any 
potential conflicts with its rival South China Sea claimants without involvement of extra-
regional powers.  China’s rivals, however, have seemingly been more successful in 
challenging China through the internationalization of the dispute and diplomatic and legal 
actions and any future success in countering China’s sovereignty claims over the South 
China Sea likely will be dependent upon similar such actions. 
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 
In the introductory chapter, I quoted Admiral Locklear as saying that land 
reclamation in the Spratlys “may negatively impact stability in the regional and the 
security environment” and “will give China the ability for greater presence, increase 
dwell time for military and coast guard assets, and expand the areas covered by 
surveillance and area-denial systems.”212  China’s land reclamation has already 
negatively impacted regional stability and likely will fuel a furthering of the regional 
arms race that is already under way.  The trajectory of the South China Sea crisis, 
however, currently remains headed in a negative direction. 
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This research suggests that China likely would have constructed these expanded 
outposts with or without the perceived provocations by China’s neighbors and the United 
States. Additionally, it is no longer possible for the United States to deter China’s 
reclamation project as the reclamation work is likely complete and construction on the 
islands is nearing completion.  It is also unclear when, if ever, China will be content with 
its military power projection capabilities and will thus no longer feel the need to continue 
expanding them.   
China is emerging as the regional hegemon and is seemingly on a trajectory 
toward becoming a global military power.  Efforts by China’s rivals do not seem to have 
stalled the growth of China’s military power, and these perceived provocative behaviors 
by China’s rivals may have even provided China with the perceived justification to 
construct these outposts earlier than it would have otherwise.  China does not seem 
willing to slow or halt its trajectory toward global military power status and it is unlikely 
efforts to curb such behavior will be successful as long as China sees the benefits of such 
actions outweighing the costs.  To date, the cost of China’s actions appears to have been 
minimal.  Ultimately, whether China continues pursuit of enhanced power projection 
capabilities will be determined by how China perceives the threat environment and the 
actions of others.  Continued perceived provocations may drive China toward further 
enhancement of its military power projection capabilities. 
Whether the South China Sea crisis deteriorates further will largely depend on 
both how China uses these newly constructed outposts and how others respond to China.  
It is potentially possible to affect how China utilizes the outposts upon the artificial 
islands.  Bonnie Glaser writes that “there is still a possibility to put a cap on militarization 
of the islands by China and the other claimants, [and] the deployment of offensive, power 
projection capabilities by any claimant would be dangerous and destabilizing.”213  The 
United States should actively continue all efforts aimed at curbing the militarization of 
the South China Sea.  This, however, will prove difficult as China appears to be unwilling 
to stop such activities. 
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Finally, the United States Navy should not abandon its commitment to 
maintaining a presence in the region and to ensuring freedom of navigation in the South 
China Sea.  The United States should continue to patrol the South China Sea and in the 
vicinity of the Spratly Islands to reinforce that none of these Spratly territories generate 
EEZ rights under UNCLOS.  U.S. Navy patrols should occur in waters claimed by all the 
claimants to ensure that the United States continues to protect freedom of navigation and 
international law at sea. 
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